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R e g io n a l O ffices:
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State of M aine
D epartment of the A ttorney G eneral
6 S tate H ouse S tation
A ugusta , M aine 04333-0006

59 Preble Street
Po r t la n d , M a in e 04101-3014
T el : (207) 822-0260

Fax : (207)8 2 2 -0 2 5 9
TDD: (877) 428-8800

April 22, 1999
Michaela M. Murphy, Esq.
Daviau, Jabar& Batten
1 Center Street
Waterville, Maine 04901-5425
Dear Ms. Murphy:
As we discussed earlier today, I am forwarding to you a ten day letter and
draft complaint for Gerald Nelson, Sr. I will be away from the office April 23
through April 29, 1999 but will be available to discuss this matter further anytime
after that.
This office has received numerous complaints regarding Gerald Nelson
Sr.’s logging business. We have investigated these complaints pursuant to our
enforcement responsibility under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.§§
206-214.
Based upon our investigation, we have concluded that the practices
engaged in by Gerald Nelson, Sr. and Nelson Logging violate the Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207. Specifically, Mr. Nelson has represented
to consumers that he will selectively harvest their wood in a way that will
encourage a healthy forest and that he will pay a fair price for the wood. In fact
he selects the most valuable wood for harvest and cuts it in a manner that harms
the residual timber stand. Also contrary to his representations, the prices that he
pays for the wood are substantially below fair market value.
In addition Mr. Nelson’s practice of soliciting consumers by letter or by
telephone other than at his place of business, without the consumer initiating the
contact and either having no written contract or entering into a written contract
that does not contain the statement of the consumers right to avoid the contract
violates the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4670. This
conduct also violates the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670.
It is our present intention to file a civil suit pursuant to the Unfair Trade
Practices Act to enjoin Mr. Nelson from continuing the practices described in the
proceeding paragraph. In addition, we will be requesting that he pay a civil
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penalty of up to a $ 10,000 per violation for intentional conduct, and make
restitution to those consumers who were victims of your unlawful conduct. We
will also request that you reimburse the Department of Attorney General for the
costs of this lawsuit, including its attorney’s fees.
Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, we are required to provide you with notice
of our intended action at least ten days prior to filing suit. The purpose of this
ten-day period is to provide you with an opportunity to meet with us to attempt to
resolve our concerns with your practices. Please contact me either by telephone
or by mail if you would like to arrange a time to discuss the matters set forth in
this letter.
I am attaching a copy of the proposed complaint for your review.
Sincerely,

LINDA CONTI
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE
V.
GERALD NELSON, SR.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The State brings this action against Gerald Nelson, Sr. pursuant to the Maine Unfair

Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-216 and the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act, 32
M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4670 seeking permanent injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties, costs and
attorneys’ fees.
n. PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, State of Maine, is a sovereign state and brings this action by and through its
Attorney General pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 191 and 209 and the powers vested in him by
common law.
3. The defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. is an individual d/b/a Nelson Logging or New
England Forestry with a place of business at 145 Smithton Road, Freedom, Maine. Gerald
Nelson, Sr. resides on Drake Hill in Albion, Maine.
m . VENUE
4. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, venue is proper in Kennebec County.
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IV. JURISDICTION
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 105 and 5
M.R.S.A § 209.
V, STATUTORY BACKGROUND
6. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §207, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct o f any
trade or business are unlawful.
7. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §209, whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
an unfair trade practice is being committed or is about to be committed, the Attorney General
may bring an action in the name of the State o f Maine against such person to restrain by
temporary or permanent injunction the act or practice and the Court may make such other orders
and judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person who has suffered any ascertainable
loss by reason of the use or employment of such unfair trade practice any monies or properties
which may have been acquired by means of the unfair trade practice.
8. Pursuant to the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M .R.S.A. §§ 4661 et. seq. Where
merchandise, including goods or services, are as a result o f a salesman's direct solicitation of the
consumer other than at the seller’s place of business, without the consumer initiating the contact,
there must be a written contract bearing the signature o f the seller and consumer, contain the date
o f the transaction, the terms o f the sale or offer, the name and the mailing address o f the seller’s
permanent place o f business, and a statement o f the consumer’s right to avoid the contract or sale
by giving written notice o f avoidance to the seller within 3 full business days following the day
on which the contract or sale was made.
9. Pursuant to 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670, and violation o f the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act
shall constitute a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

2

VLFACTS
10. Gerald Nelson, Sr. has worked as a logger, cutting wood on woodlots owned by
others, his whole life. He has been semi-retired since about 1993. Since 1993, Gerald Nelson, Sr.
has worked as a logger with his son, Gerald Nelson, Jr.
11. The defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. has engaged in a pattern and practice o f unfair and
deceptive conduct including but not limited to the following:
A. Consumer # 1
12. In 1997, Gerald Nelson, Sr. sent a letter to a New Jersey resident who owns a woodlot
in Hampden, Maine. In the letter, Gerald Nelson, Sr. stated "We are writing about your land in
Hampden, Maine. We have a small logging business, and would like to do some selective
cutting on your land. We do very good work, and will offer fair prices for the wood. Choosine
Selective Cutting will improve the quality o f you (sic) land for the future. If you are interested in
more details o f Selective Cutting give us a call or write."(emphasis original). Gerald Nelson, Sr.
followed this letter to the New Jersey resident with a phone call.
13. An inspection of the lot shows that the defendant damaged many o f the trees left on
the site due to poor logging practices. For example trees were felled without the use o f
directional falling techniques. Many o f the severely damaged trees were dead at thé time o f
inspection due to wind throw, which was a direct result o f machinery wheel ruts which cut or
damaged the root systems of trees which were adjacent to poorly placed skid trails. Litter, which
came from the timber harvest was found on the property. The harvest was a high grade type
harvest, taking the best and leaving the rest, which resulted in a degradation o f the residual stand
of timber.
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14.

Gerald Nelson, Sr. paid the landowner $3,000 for the wood harvested from this lot.

The Maine Forest Service estimates the total value o f the wood taken from the lot to be about
$17,250.00.
B. Consumer #2
15. In February o f 1997, Gerald Nelson, Jr. sent a letter to a resident o f Connecticut who
owns a woodlot in Ellsworth, Maine. In the letter Gerald Nelson, Jr. states: "I have a small
logging business and would like to do some Selective Cutting on your land. I do very good work,
and offer fair prices for the wood. I see there is a lot o f Selective cutting that could be done to
turn your lot into a healthy forest."
16. As a result o f this letter, on or about August, 1997, the landowner, who had moved to
South Carolina, entered into a contract for the harvesting o f his woodlot with Gerald Nelson, Sr.
The harvest degraded and devalued the existing residual stand o f timber as well as limiting future
silviculural options using natural regeneration by removing the high value and high growth white
pine and leaving the low quality hardwoods. 330 board feet o f white pine logs which were
marketable at the time of harvest, were left on the lot not brought to market. These logs are now
degraded to pulp quality. The contract prices for the types o f wood harvested, were roughly onethird o f the average market price. The defendant paid the consumer $1500 for the wood
harvested.
C. Consumer #3
17. On or about February of 1997, Gerald Nelson, Jr. sent a letter to a another resident o f
Connecticut who owns a woodlot in Ellsworth. The letter was identical to the letter quoted in
paragraph 15. On or about September 1997, this woodlot owner entered into a contract with
Gerald Nelson, Sr. In the harvest of this lot, the best and most valuable trees were cut while low
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grade, rough and rotten trees were left standing or broken down and left. The overall quality of
the trees in the stand were severely degraded. The landowner terminated the harvest prior to its
completion.
D. Consum er #4
19. On or about February o f 1998, a resident o f New Hampshire who owns woodlots in
Damariscotta, Maine received the same letter from Nelson Logging. On or about March 1,1998,
Gerry Nelson called this landowner. The landowner agreed to meet with Gerald Nelson, Sr. on
March 5,1998. On or about March 3,1998 the landowner cancelled the March 5 meeting. On or
about March 11, 1998, the landowner received scale slips and a check for $1,500. Although the
landowner never gave permission or entered into a contract, Gerald Nelson, Sr. harvested his
Damariscotta lot on March 2-6,1998, taking about $8,500 worth o f wood.
E. M isrepresentations
20. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents material facts to induce consumers to
enter contracts with him that allow him to harvest wood from their woodlots.
21. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. intentionally creates the impression that the harvest will
be selective and will improve the overall health o f the woodlot when in fact he harvests only the
most valuable wood and leaves the undesirable wood on the lot.
22. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents that he does a good job in harvesting
wood lots when in fact his harvesting operations include violations of acceptable forestry
practices.
23. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents the price he pays for wood he harvests as
fair when in fact is below fair market value.
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24. Consumers rely on Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s misrepresentations when making a
decision to contract with him to harvest their woodlots.
F. Three Day Right to Cancel/ W ritten C ontract R equired
25. Gerald Nelson, Sr. solicits consumers by sending letters or calling them. He directly
solicits them other than at his place of business without the consumer initiating the contact.
26. On some occasions when Gerald Nelson, Sr. solicited business from woodlot owners,
he entered into written contracts with them. At other times there was no written contract.
27. The written contracts that Gerald Nelson, Sr. entered into with these woodlot owners
did not contain a statement of the consumer’s right to avoid the contract by giving written notice
to the seller by ordinary mail, postage prepaid, within 3 full business days following the day on
which the contract or sale was made.
v n COUNT I
(Unfair Trade Practices Act)
M ISREPRESENTATIONS
28. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the preceding
paragraphs of this complaint.
29. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. 's practice of misrepresenting facts material to a
consumer's decision to enter into a contract for the harvest o f his or her woodlot constitutes a
pattern or practice o f unfair and deceptive conduct in violation o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
30. Gerald Nelson Sr.’s practices as described in this Count are intentional.
vm co unt n
(Consumer Solicitation Sales Act/ Unfair Trade Practices Act)
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VIOLATION OF CONSUM ER SO L IC IT A T IO N SALES
31. The plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates herein by reference the preceding
paragraphs o f the complaint.
32. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s practice of soliciting consumer sales other than at his
place o f business and entering into written contracts that do not include a notice of the
consumer’s right to avoid the contract within three business days violates the Consumer
Solicitations Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et. seq.
33. Pursuant to 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670, Defendant's conduct also violates the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 5 M.R.S. A § 207.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff requests the following relief:
1. Declare the conduct of Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. as described in this Complaint is
in violation o f the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
2. Permanently enjoin Gerald Nelson, Sr. his agents, servants, employees and those
persons in active concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of the injunction
from:
A. Misrepresenting to consumers that he will pay fair prices for their wood;
B. Misrepresenting to consumers that he will harvest woodlots to promote a
healthy forest;
C. Entering into contracts with consumers that he solicits that do not contain the
three day cooling off period required by 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et seq.;
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D. Misrepresenting to consumers the nature and extent o f the cutting that he will
on their woodlots;
E. Making any other misrepresentations in the course o f soliciting and performing
contracts to harvest woodlots.
3. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670 , permanently enjoin Gerald
Nelson, Sr., his agents, servants, employees and those persons in active concert or participation
with him who receive actual notice o f the injunction from entering into contracts with
consumers that he solicits that do not contain the three day cooling off period required by 32
M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et seq.
4. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to submit an accounting o f all wood he has
harvested from January 1, 1997 to the present including the name and address o f the landowner,
the amount o f wood taken, the amount Nelson received for the wood and the amount he paid the
landowner.
5. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay restitution to all landowners who have been
injured by his unlawful practices.
6. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay to the Department o f the Attorney General,
pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $10,000 for each
intentional violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
7. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay the Department o f the Attorney General the
costs o f suit and investigation, including attorneys’ fees.
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8.

Order such other and further relief as may be necessary to remedy the effects o f the

Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s unfair and deceptive practices.

Dated: June 14,1999

Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW REITERER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Linda J. C o n ti^ e . Bar No.3638
Assistant Attorney General
Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
Tel. (207) 626-8800
Attorneys for the State o f Maine
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

GERALD NELSON, SR.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

MOTION FOR SPECIAL APPOINTMENT
TO SERVE COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS
PURSUANT TO M.R.Civ.P. RULE 4(c)(2)
WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM
OF LAW

)

Defendant.

)

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, the State of Maine, and moves this Court to specially
appoint an officer in the Attorney General’s Office to serve process, specifically the
Complaint and Summons, upon the Defendant in the above-captioned matter. Plaintiff
states that in spite of diligent efforts to serve the Defendant, service has not been made.
Plaintiff further states in support of this Motion that this special appointment of an officer
in the Attorney General's Office will result in savings of travel fees and will permit timely
service of process on the Defendant. Under these circumstances, special appointment
“shall be made freely” pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. Rule 4(c)(2)

Dated at Augusta, Maine, this__ day of September, 1999

Assistant Attorney General
Me. Bar No. 3638
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff,
V.

GERALD NELSON, SR.
Defendant.

)
)
)
Ì
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

The Plaintiffs Motion for Special Appointment of an officer in the Attorney
General’s Office to serve the ComplOOOOOOOOaint and Summons on Gerald Nelson, Sr.
is granted.

Dated :

_______________
Justice, Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ORDER

)
)

GERALD NELSON, SR.
Defendant.

)
)

The Plaintiff’s Motion for Special Appointment of an officer in the Attorney
General’s Office to serve the GomplOOOUOO09aint and Summons on Gerald Nelson, Sr.
is granted.

Dated :
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

GERALD NELSON, SR.,
Defendant

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

*
*

NOW COMES the Defendant and answers the Plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A.

The Plaintiff has stated allegations against Gerald Nelson, Jr., in attempts
to prosecute the Defendant herein, based upon Gerald Nelson, Jr.’s acts.
To do so would be failing to state a cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant hereby moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint and for costs.
B.

The Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient as a matter of law.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant hereby moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint and for costs.
The Defendant Answers the Plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
1.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph one of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
denied.

2.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph two of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
neither admitted or denied, as the same is not within the knowledge of the
Defendant.

3.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph three of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
denied.

4.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph four of Plaintiffs Complaint are
neither admitted or denied, as the same is not within the knowledge of the
Defendant.

5.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph five of Plaintiffs Complaint are
denied.

6.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph six of Plaintiffs Complaint are
denied.

7.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph seven of Plaintiff's Complaint are
denied.

8.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph eight of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
denied.
* -

9.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph nine of Plaintiffs Complaint are
neither admitted or denied, as the same is not within the knowledge of the
Defendant.

10.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph ten of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
denied.

11.

The allegations as set forth iri paragraph eleven of Plaintiffs Complaint
are denied.

12.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twelve of Plaintiff’s Complaint are
denied.

13.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph thirteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

14.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph fourteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

15.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph fifteen of Plaintiffs Complaint are
denied.

16.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph sixteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

17.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph seventeen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

18.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph eighteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

19.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph nineteen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

20.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty of Plaintiffs Complaint are
denied.

21.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-one of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.

22.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-two of Plaintiffs
Complaint are denied.

23.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-three of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.
- -

24.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-four of Plaintiffs
Complaint are denied.

25.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-five of Plaintiffs
Complaint are denied.

26.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-six of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

27.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-seven of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.

28.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-eight of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.

29.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph twenty-nine of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.

30.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph thirty of Plaintiff's Complaint are
denied.

o I,

The allegations as set forth in paragraph thirty-one of Plaintiff’s Complaint
are denied.

32.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph thirty-two of Plaintiffs Complaint
are denied.

33.

The allegations as set forth in paragraph thirty-three of Plaintiff’s
Complaint are denied.

WHEREFORE, Defendant hereby moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint, with costs.
Dated: September 24, 1999
Sumner H. Lipman, Esq. Bar No. 300
Attorney for Defendant
LIPMAN & KATZ, P.A.
227 Water St., P.O. Box 1051
Augusta, ME 04332-1051
(207) 622-3711
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,
Sumner H. Lipman, Esq., hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint has been mailed, this date, postage
prepaid, to: Linda J. Conti, Assistant Attorney General, 6 State House Station, Augusta,
ME 04333-0006.
Dated: September 24, 1999
Sumner H. Lipman, Esq.

STATE OF MAINE

ss.

KENNEBEC

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. q q - n ?

STATE OF MAINE

Plaintiff
v.

SCH ED ULIN G ORDER
(M.R.Civ.P. 16(a))

GERALD NELSON SR

Defendant
1.
Joinder of Parties and Am endm ent of Pleadings. Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
new parties may not be joined, and third party complaints and motions to amend the pleadings may not be
filed later than 4 months from the date of this order. If new parties are added, all deadlines remain the same
unless otherwise ordered by the court.
2.
E xpert W itn ess D esignations. Unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown, each
party may designate no more than one expert per issue. For purposes of expert witness designation, parties
with common interests shall be considered one party. Unless the court orders otherwise for good cause
shown, the expert witness designation shall include a complete statement of the information and reports
required by M.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). The designation by the plaintiff(s) shall be filed not later than 3
months from the date of this order. The designation by the defendant(s) shall be filed not later than 5_months
from the date of this order. No extensions of the designation deadlines will be granted except on motion
demonstrating good cause and that discovery was timely and diligently conducted in good faith. Counsel
shall not assume that agreements to designate experts beyond these deadlines will be accepted by the court.
Such extensions shall not delay trial.
3.
Discovery Deadline. Unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown, discovery shall be
completed not later than 8 months after the date of this order. Discovery shall be initiated so as to enable the
opposing party to serve a response within the period allowed by the rules but in advance of this deadline. No
extensions of the discovery period will be granted except on motion demonstrating good cause and that
discovery was timely and diligently conducted in good faith. Counsel shall not assume that agreements to
conduct discovery beyond this deadline will be accepted by the court. Such agreements shall not delay trial.

4.
Jury T rial. A plaintiff requesting trial by jury shall file with the clerk a request in writing
accompanied by the $300 fee within 20 days from the date of this order. The defendant, or any other party,
may request trial by jury by filing a request in writing accompanied by the $300 fee within 30 days from the
date of this order. If a party fails to make a request and tender the payment in accordance with this provision,
the right to jury trial is waived. If a party seeks a jury trial on less than all issues, they shall so state in their
request.
5.
Estim ate o f Tim e Required for Trial. Not later than 15 days after the discovery deadline, the
parties shall confer and the plaintiff shall file with the court a good faith estimate of the number of days
required for trial. Counsel may request the case be processed pursuant to Rule 16(b) or 16(c).

6.
Exchange o f W itness and Exhibit Lists. Not later than 15 days after the discovery deadline,
each party shall serve on all other parties a list of the name and place of residence or business address of each
witness expected to be called at trial and a list of exhibits, including demonstrative aides to be offered or used
at trial.
7.
D eadline for Filing M otions. All motions, except motions in limine or those affecting the
conduct of the trial, shall be filed pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 7 not later than 60 days following the close of
discovery. Motions filed alter the close of discovery will not prevent a case from being placed on the trial list.

8.
Sanctions. Failure to comply with deadlines as ordered may result in the imposition of sanctions
pursuant to M.R.Civ.P 16(d).
Motions to amend or alter this order shall be filed within 10 days of the date of this order.
The entry will be: “Scheduling Order filed. Discovery deadline is
MAY 28, 2000.
Date:

SEPTEMBER 28, 1999.

justice, Superior Court
CV-127, 03/99

___________

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE
V.
GERALD NELSON, SR.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DESIGNATION

Pursuant to the pretrial Order entered by the Court, the Plaintiff State o f Maine hereby
designates the following expert witnesses and discloses the information required by M.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(4).
Each expert is a licensed Forester. Each expert is expected to testify consistent with his
prior report, a copy o f which is attached hereto, as to the stumpage value o f the wood harvested
from the wood lot, the type o f harvest performed and the condition o f the wood lot after the
harvest. Each forester relied on the 1997 Stumpage Prices as compiled and reported by the Maine
Forest Service , a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
M erle R ing received a B.S. in forestry from the University o f Maine in 1976. He has
been a licensed Forester employed by the Maine Forest Service since 1977. He has been a
District Forester with the Maine Forest Service since 1984. He is not receiving any
compensation for his work in this case, other than his regular salary from the Maine Forest
Service.
Mr. Ring performed a 100% stump cruise to determine the amount o f wood cut and the
estimated value o f that wood on a lot located in Otisfield, Maine and owned by Allen Pittsley.
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Mr. Ring is expected to testify consistent with his report which is attached hereto as Ring Exhibit
A, that the stumpage value of the wood harvested is $3,543.
Mr. Ring is also expected to testify that he reviewed Mr. N elson’s contract with Mr. Ring
and compared the contract prices with the Maine Forest Service Annual Average Stumpage
prices. He is expected to testify that based upon this review the contract prices are well below
average. A copy o f the contract is attached hereto as Ring Exhibit B..
G ordon M oore received a B.S. in Biology in 1979 from the University o f Maine at Fort
Kent. Mr. Moore received an Associates Degree in forestry from the University o f Maine at Fort
Kent in 1994. He also became a licensed forester in 1994.
From 1982 to 1991 he worked in the woods as a logger. In 1991 he went to work for the
Land U se Regulatory Commission as an Enforcement Investigator where he worked until 1998
when he left to work for the Maine Forest Service. He is currently employed by the Maine Forest
Service as a forester. He is not receiving any compensation for his work in this case, other than
his regular salary from the Maine Forest Service. Mr. Moore conducted a cruise on a property
located in Hampden, Maine owned by Frank Vaccaro. He performed a 25% stump tally to
determine the volume and approximate value o f the wood taken and a 2% damage assessment to
determine the condition o f the residual timber stand.
Mr. Moore is expected to testify consistent with his report, a copy o f which is attached
hereto, as Moore Exhibit A, that the harvest was “high grade” and that the residual timber stand
was damaged by the harvest and that the estimated value o f the timber harvested according to the
Maine Forest Service 1997 Stumpage Price Report for Penobscot County at $17,247.
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In reaching his opinion, Mr. Moore reviewed the letter that Mr. Nelson sent to Mr.
Vaccaro and the contract that they entered into. The letter is attached hereto as Moore Exhibit B
and the contract is attached hereto as Moore Exhibit C.
Roger R yder has been a licensed forester since 1982. He has been employed by the
Maine Forest Service in 1993-94 and 1997 to the present. He is not receiving any compensation
for his work in this case in addition to this regular salary.
Mr. Ryder has a Masters Degree in forestry from the University o f Maine. He taught a
course in timber harvesting at the University of Maine at Orono from 1993 through 1995. Mr.
Ryder also developed and taught a forestry program at the Region 3 Vocational School in
Lincoln, Maine in 1996-1997.
In 1992, Mr. Ryder published a paper as part o f a symposium held at Oregon State
University on Soil Disturbance. He has also had two papers published by the American
Pulpwood Association: Tree Attributes Which Influence Products in Woods Processors in 1997
and Analysis o f Mechanical Down Time in Woods Processors in 1998.
Mr. Ryder assessed a lot owned by Ronald Reed and located in Ellsworth, Maine. Mr.
Ryder is expected to testify consistent with his report which is attached hereto as Ryder Exhibit
A, that N elson’s harvest o f the lot degraded and devalued the existing residual timber stand. He
is also expected to testify that Nelson performed a high grading harvest. Mr. Ryder also
reviewed the letter sent to Mr. Reed and the contract entered into between Mr. Reed and Mr.
Nelson. Comparing the contract prices to the 1997 Stumpage Price Report, Mr. Ryder is
expected to testify that the contract prices offered by Nelson are well below average. The letter
and contract are attached hereto as Ryder Exhibits B and C.
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Dated: December 22, 1999

Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW REITERER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Assistant Attorney General
Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
Tel. (207) 626-8800
Attorneys for the State o f Maine
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
•V.
GERALD NELSON, SR.,
Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

After a telephonic hearing on the State’s request for clarification as to the number of
expert witnesses it may designate in this case, and the defendant indicating no objection, the
Order and entry is as follows.
The State seeks to designate four foresters to testify as expert witnesses in this case:
a.

Jim McMullen is the State’s expert with respect to a woodlot owned by Harry
Harden located in Damariscotta;

b.

M erle Ring is the State’s expert with respect to a woodlot owned by Allen
Pittsley, located in Otisfield;

c.

Gordon Moore is the State’ expert with respect to a woodlot owned by Frank
Vacarro, located in Hampden; and

d. Roger Ryder is the State’s expert with respect to a woodlot owned by Ronald
Reed, located in Ellsworth.

The Court finds that each woodlot that is the subject o f the complaint presents a separate
issue. Therefore the State may designate a different expert forester to testify with
respect to each woodlot.

Dated:

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
v.

„

GERALD NELSON, SR.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132

)
)
)
)
)

M OTION TO W IT H D R A W

NOW COMES Sumner Lipman and hereby moves to withdraw as counsel for Gerald Nelson,
Sr.

Attorney Michaela Murphy has agreed to undertake his representation and will be entering an

appearance.

Dated: January 12, 2000

LIPMAN & KATZ, P.A.
227 Water Street, 2nd Floor
Post Office B ox 1051
Augusta, Maine 04332-1051
Telephone: (207)622-3711

Certificate o f Service
I,
Sumner H. Lipman, hereby certify that a copy o f the foregoing Motion to Withdraw has been
mailed, this date, to Linda J. Conti, Assistant Attorney General, 6 State House Station, Augusta, Maine
04333-0006.
Dated: January 12, 2000

Sumner H. Lipman
Bar Number: 300
ORDER:
It is hereby O RDERED that the M otion to W ithdraw filed by Stunner HdLinm an i s / /
G RANTED/DENTB^.
^
<'/
Dated:

/—/ / ^ ^

r
Justice, Superior Court

¿S

X

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132

STA TE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

GERALD NELSON, SR.,
Defendant
To:

)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF STA TE OF M A IN E ’S
A M EN DED NO TICE OF DEPO SITIO N
TO GERALD N ELSON, SR.

M ichaela M urphy, Esq.
Daviau, Jabar & Batten
1 Center Street
W aterville, M aine 04901-5425
Please take notice that on Tuesday, February 8, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., at the offices o f the

Attorney General, Key Bank Tower, 286 Water Street, (4th floor), Augusta, Maine, Plaintiff,
State o f Maine, will take the deposition o f Gerald Nelson, Sr. upon oral examination, pursuant to
the Maine Rules o f Civil Procedure.
The deposition will be taken before a notary public or some other officer authorized by
law to administer oaths, and will be recorded by means o f a stenotype machine.
The deposition will continue until completed. You are invited to attend and cross
examine.
Dated at Augusta, Maine, this 18th day o f January, 2000.

Linda J. Conti U
Assistant Attorney General
Me. St. Bar No. 3638
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Attorney for State o f Maine
cc:

Pieske Reporting Service

R e g io n a l O ffices:

84 H arlow S t ., 2 nd Floor
Ba n g o r , M a in e 04401
TEL: (207) 941-3070
Fax : (207) 941-3075
Telephone: (2Q7) 6 2 6 -3 8 0 0
FAX: (2 0 7 ] 2 8 7 -3 1 4 5
TOO: (2 0 7 ) 6 2 6 -B 8 6 5

S tate of M aine
D epartment of the A ttorney G eneral
6 State H ouse S tation
A ugusta , M aine 04333-0006

59 P rerle S treet
Po r t l a n d , M a in e 04101-3014
T el : (207) 822-0260
Fax : (207) 822-0259
T D D : (877) 428-8800

April 22, 1999
Michaela M. Murphy, Esq.
Daviau, Jabar& Batten
1 Center Street
Waterville, Maine 04901-5425
Dear Ms. Murphy:
As we discussed earlier today, I am forwarding to you a ten day letter and
draft complaint for Gerald Nelson, Sr. I will be away from the office April 23
through April 29,1999 but will be available to discuss this matter further anytime
after that.
This office has received numerous complaints regarding Gerald Nelson
Sr.’s logging business. We have investigated these complaints pursuant to our
enforcement responsibility under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.§§
206-214.
Based upon our investigation, we have concluded that the practices
engaged in by Gerald Nelson, Sr. and Nelson Logging violate the Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207. Specifically, Mr. Nelson has represented
to consumers that he will selectively harvest their wood in a way that will
encourage a healthy forest and that he will pay a fair price for the wood. In fact
he selects the most valuable wood for harvest and cuts it in a manner that harms
the residual timber stand. Also contrary to his representations, the prices that he
pays for the wood are substantially below fair market value.
In addition Mr. Nelson’s practice of soliciting consumers by letter or by
telephone other than at his place of business, without the consumer initiating the
contact and either having no written contract or entering into a written contract
that does not contain the statement of the consumers right to avoid the contract
violates the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4670. This
conduct also violates the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670.
It is our present intention to file a civil suit pursuant to the Unfair Trade
Practices Act to enjoin Mr. Nelson from continuing the practices described in the
proceeding paragraph. In addition, we will be requesting that he pay a civil

l'iin u -J m i Ri-\ Y‘ li*»l

penalty of up to a $10,000 per violation for intentional conduct, and make
restitution to those consumers who were victims of your unlawful conduct. We
will also request that you reimburse the Department of Attorney General for the
costs of this lawsuit, including its attorney's fees.
Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, we are required to provide you with notice
of our intended action at least ten days prior to filing suit. The purpose of this
ten-day period is to provide you with an opportunity to meet with us to attempt to
resolve our concerns with your practices. Please contact me either by telephone
or by mail if you would like to arrange a time to discuss the matters set forth in
this letter.
I am attaching a copy of the proposed complaint for your review.
Sincerely,

LINDA CONTI
Assistant Attorney General

/

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE
V.
GERALD NELSON, SR.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99)
)
)
)
)

COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The State brings this action against Gerald Nelson, Sr. pursuant to the Maine Unfair

Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-216 and the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act, 32
M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4670 seeking permanent injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties, costs and
attorneys’ fees.
n . PARTIES
2. Plaintiff, State of Maine, is a sovereign state and brings this action by and through its
Attorney General pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§191 and 209 and the powers vested in him by
common law.
3. The defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. is an individual d/b/a Nelson Logging or New
England Forestry with a place of business at 145 Smithton Road, Freedom, Maine. Gerald
Nelson, Sr. resides on Drake Hill in Albion, Maine.
m . VENUE
4. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, venue is proper in Kennebec County.

I

IV. JURISDICTION
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 105 and 5
M.R.S.A § 209.
V. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
6. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §207, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in' the conduct o f any
trade or business are unlawful.
7. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §209, whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that
an unfair trade practice is being committed or is about to be committed, the Attorney General
may bring an action in the name of the State o f Maine against such person to restrain by
temporary or permanent injunction the act or practice and the Court may make such other orders
and judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person who has suffered any ascertainable
loss by reason o f the use or employment o f such unfair trade practice any monies or properties
which may have been acquired by means of the unfair trade practice.
8. Pursuant to the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et. seq. Where
merchandise, including goods or services, are as a result o f a salesman's direct solicitation o f the
consumer other than at the seller’s place of business, without the consumer initiating the contact,
there must be a written contract bearing the signature of the seller and consumer, contain the date
o f the transaction, the terms of the sale or offer, the name and the mailing address o f the seller’s
permanent place o f business, and a statement o f the consumer’s right to avoid the contract or sale
by giving written notice of avoidance to the seller within 3 full business days following the day
on which the contract or sale was made.
9. Pursuant to 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670, and violation of the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act
shall constitute a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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VI. FACTS
10. Gerald Nelson, Sr. has worked as a logger, cutting wood on woodlots owned by
others, his whole life. He has been semi-retired since about 1993. Since 1993, Gerald Nelson, Sr.
has worked as a logger with his son, Gerald Nelson, Jr.
11. The defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. has engaged in a pattern and practice o f unfair and
deceptive conduct including but not limited to the following:
A. Consumer # 1
12. In 1997, Gerald Nelson, Sr. sent a letter to a N ew Jersey resident who owns a woodlot
in Hampden, Maine. In the letter, Gerald Nelson, Sr. stated "We are writing about your land in
Hampden, Maine. We have a small logging business, and would like to do some selective
cutting on your land. We do very good work, and will offer fair prices for the wood. Choosing
Selective Cutting will improve the quality of you (sic) land for the future. If you are interested in
more details of Selective Cutting give us a call or write."(emphasis original). Gerald Nelson, Sr.
followed this letter to the New Jersey resident with a phone call.
13. An inspection of the lot shows that the defendant damaged many o f the trees left on
the site due to poor logging practices. For example trees were felled without the use of
directional falling techniques. Many of the severely damaged trees were dead at the time of
inspection due to wind throw, which was a direct result o f machinery wheel ruts which cut or
damaged the root systems o f trees which were adjacent to poorly placed skid trails. Litter, which
came from the timber harvest was found on the property. The harvest was a high grade type
harvest, taking the best and leaving the rest, which resulted in a degradation o f the residual stand
of timber.
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14.

GeraId Nelson, Sr. paid the landowner $3,000 for the wood harvested from this lot.

The Maine Forest Service estimates the total value of the wood taken from the lot to be about
$17,250.00.
B. Consumer #2
15. In February o f 1997, Gerald Nelson, Jr. sent a letter to a resident o f Connecticut who
owns a woodlot in Ellsworth, Maine. In the letter Gerald N elson, Jr. states: "I have a small
logging business and would like to do some Selective Cutting on your land. I do very good work,
and offer fair prices for the wood. I see there is a lot of Selective cutting that could be done to
turn your lot into a healthy forest."
16. As a result of this letter, on or about August, 1997, the landowner, who had moved to
South Carolina, entered into a contract for the harvesting o f his woodlot with Gerald Nelson, Sr.
The harvest degraded and devalued the existing residual stand o f timber as well as limiting future
silviculural options using natural regeneration by removing the high value and high growth white
pine and leaving the low quality hardwoods. 330 board feet o f white pine logs which were
marketable at the time of harvest, were left on the lot not brought to market. These logs are now
degraded to pulp quality. The contract prices for the types o f w ood harvested, were roughly onethird o f the average market price. The defendant paid the consumer $1500 for the wood
harvested.
C. Consumer #3
17. On or about February of 1997, Gerald Nelson, Jr. sent a letter to a another resident of
Connecticut who owns a woodlot in Ellsworth. The letter was identical to the letter quoted in
paragraph 15. On or about September 1997, this woodlot owner entered into a contract with
Gerald Nelson, Sr. In the harvest of this lot, the best and most valuable trees were cut while low
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grade, rough and rotten trees were left standing or broken down and left. The overall quality o f
the trees in the stand were severely degraded. The landowner terminated the harvest prior to its
completion.
D. Consumer #4
19. On or about February o f 1998, a resident o f New Hampshire who owns woodlots in
Damariscotta, Maine received the same letter from Nelson Logging. On or about March 1,1998,
Gerry Nelson called this landowner. The landowner agreed to meet with Gerald Nelson, Sr. on
March 5,1 9 9 8 . On or about March 3 ,1 9 9 8 the landowner cancelled the March 5 meeting. On or
about March 11,1998, the landowner received scale slips and a check for $1,500. Although the
landowner never gave permission or entered into a contract, Gerald Nelson, Sr. harvested his
Damariscotta lot on March 2-6,1998, taking about $8,500 worth o f wood.
E. Misrepresentations
20. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents material facts to induce consumers to
enter contracts with him that allow him to harvest wood from their woodlots.
21. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. intentionally creates the impression that the harvest will
be selective and will improve the overall health o f the woodlot when in fact he harvests only the
most valuable wood and leaves the undesirable wood on the lot.
22. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents that he does a good job in harvesting
wood lots when in fact his harvesting operations include violations of acceptable forestry
practices.
23. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. misrepresents the price he pays for wood he harvests as

fair when in fact is below fair market value.
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24. Consumers rely on Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s misrepresentations when making a
decision to contract with him to harvest their woodlots.
F. Three Day Right to Cancel/ Written Contract R equired
25. Gerald Nelson, Sr. solicits consumers by sending letters or calling them. He directly
solicits them other than at his place o f business without the consumer initiating the contact.
26. On some occasions when Gerald Nelson, Sr. solicited business from woodlot owners,
he entered into written contracts with them. At other times there was no written contract.
27. The written contracts that Gerald Nelson, Sr. entered into with these woodlot owners
did not contain a statement o f the consumer’s right to avoid the contract by giving written notice
to the seller by ordinary mail, postage prepaid, within 3 full business days following the day on
which the contract or sale was made.
v n COUNT I
(Unfair Trade Practices Act)
M ISREPRESENTATIONS
28. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates herein by reference the preceding
paragraphs o f this complaint.
29. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. 's practice of misrepresenting facts material to a
consumer's decision to enter into a contract for the harvest o f his or her woodlot constitutes a
pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive conduct in violation o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
5 M .R.S.A. § 207.
30. Gerald Nelson Sr.’s practices as described in this Count are intentional.
vm count n

(Consumer Solicitation Sales Act/ Unfair Trade Practices Act)
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VIOLATION OF CONSUM ER SO L IC IT A T IO N SALES
31. The plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates herein by reference the preceding
paragraphs o f the complaint.
32. Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s practice of soliciting consumer sales other than at his
place o f business and entering into written contracts that do not include a notice o f the
consumer’s right to avoid the contract within three business days violates the Consumer
Solicitations Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et. seq.
33. Pursuant to 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670, Defendant's conduct also violates the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 5 M.R.S. A § 207.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiff requests the following relief:
1. Declare the conduct of Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. as described in this Complaint is
in violation o f the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act.
2. Permanently enjoin Gerald Nelson, Sr. his agents, servants, employees and those
persons in active concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of the injunction
from:
A. Misrepresenting to consumers that he will pay fair prices for their wood;
B. Misrepresenting to consumers that he will harvest woodlots to promote a
healthy forest;

C. Entering into contracts with consumers that he solicits that do not contain the
three day cooling off period required by 32 M .R.S.A. §§ 4661 et seq.;
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D. Misrepresenting to consumers the nature and extent o f the cutting that he will
on their woodlots;
E. Making any other misrepresentations in the course of soliciting and performing
contracts to harvest woodlots.
3. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670 , permanently enjoin Gerald
Nelson, Sr., his agents, servants, employees and those persons in active concert or participation
with him who receive actual notice o f the injunction from entering into contracts with
consumers that he solicits that do not contain the three day cooling off period required by 32
M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et seq.
4. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to submit an accounting o f all wood he has
harvested from January 1,1997 to the present including the name and address o f the landowner,
the amount o f wood taken, the amount Nelson received for the wood and the amount he paid the
landowner.
5. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay restitution to all landowners who have been
injured by his unlawful practices.
6. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay to the Department o f the Attorney General,
pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $10,000 for each
intentional violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
7. Order Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr. to pay the Department o f the Attorney General the
costs o f suit and investigation, including attorneys’ fees.

8

8. Order such other and further relief as may be necessary to remedy the effects o f the
Defendant Gerald Nelson, Sr.’s unfair and deceptive practices.

Dated: June 14,1999

Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW REITERER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Li
Assistant Attorney General
Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
Tel. (207) 626-8800

38

Attorneys for the State o f Maine
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DOCKET NO. CV-99-131

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
GERALD NELSON, JR.,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Counsel for the Plaintiff, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and M.R.Civ.P. 54(b)(3)
hereby m ove for an award o f attorney’s fees and costs in the amount o f $7,308.44, and in
support thereof, states as follows:
This action was brought by the Plaintiff State o f Maine Attorney General in July
o f 1999 against Gerald Nelson, Jr. for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5
M .R.S.A. §§ 209 and 207, seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties and restitution for
consumers who were harmed by the Defendant’s unlawful practices.
Plaintiff filed the complaint in July of 1999. Soon thereafter Defendant Nelson
filed a bankruptcy petition. The Plaintiff sought and was granted an order clarifying that
the state court action was excepted from the automatic stay. See In re N elson, 240 B.R.
802 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999). After the relief from stay was granted the plaintiff proceeded
with discovery in the state court action and prepared a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.

?

After discovery concluded and due to the large number o f witnesses, the Plaintiff
requested that the Court hold a pretrial conference and set the trial for a date certain.
Follow ing the pretrial conference, Plaintiff prepared witnesses and exhibits and a pretrial
memorandum. A civil nonjury trial was held in the afternoon o f June 4 th and the morning
o f June 5th, 2001. The Defendant Gerald Nelson, Jr. did not appear at the trial. The
Plaintiff presented evidence through the testimony of sixteen witnesses.
Follow ing the trial, which was held in Kennebec County Superior Court, the
Plaintiff submitted a proposed Decision and Order, as directed by the Court.
5 M .R.S.A. § 209 provides that in any action under the Unfair Trade Practices Act
where a permanent injunction is issued, the Court may order the person against whom the
permanent injunction has been issued to pay the State the cost o f the investigation o f that
person by the Attorney General and the cost o f the suit, which funds shall accrue to the
general fund. In this case, the Court issued a permanent injunction on June 18, 2001.
In petitioning for fees, P laintiffs counsel has diligently exercised billing
judgment. Linda Conti, Assistant Attorney General worked on all aspects of this case, as
indicated in the Affidavit attached hereto.
The hourly rate charged by the Attorney General's Office for Attorney Conti is
fair and reasonable compensation for Assistant Attorneys General of her level of
experience and standing in the State of Maine. See State of Maine v. Patten Corp., 617
A .2d 210 (Me. 1992). Wherefore, Plaintiff State o f Maine request that this Court enter an
order directing the Defendant Gerald Nelson, Jr. to pay the Plaintiff s attorney’s fees in
the amount o f $4,125.00 and costs of $3,183.44 for a total award o f $7,308.44.
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Dated: Jvme 'U j onm

X.

LINDA J. CONTI - Me./fear No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department o f the Attorney General
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
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************************************
*

In re :
GERALD NELSON

*
*

Chapter
13
Case No. 99-11185

*
Debtor
************************************

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Before me is the State of Maine's motion seeking
clarification of the automatic stay's scope or, alternatively,
relief from the stay.

The material facts are not in dispute.

The parties and the Chapter 13 trustee have argued the motion's
merits and have briefed the issues.
below,

For the reasons set forth

I conclude that the State's pending state court action

against the debtor is excepted from U.S. Bankruptcy Code
§ 362(a) 's automatic stay by § 362 (b)(4).1

FACTS
Gerald Nelson filed a voluntary Chapter 13 petition on July
19, 1999. Pending in Superior Court for Kennebec County at that
time was the State of Maine's complaint alleging violations of
Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act, see Me. Rev.
5, §§ 206-214

l

S t a t . Ann. tit.

(West 1989 & S u p p . 1998), and the Consumer

This memorandum sets forth my conclusion of law
pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 (made
applicable to this contested matter by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7052) and Federal Rule Civil Procedure 52.
Unless
otherwise noted, all references to statutory sections are to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code" or "Code"), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et s e q .

Solicitations Sales Act.
§§ 4661-4671

(West 1999).

civil penalties,

See Me. Rev. S t a t . Ann. tit 32,
The State sought injunctive relief,

restitution, and costs.2

Among other things,

the state court complaint alleged that Nelson violated state law
in his dealings with four, named landowners.

In each case Nelson

allegedly misrepresented the scope of work he was to perform,
failed to provide a written contract or provided a contract in
impermissible form, harvested wood of a value exceeding the
agreed price, and did not pay the landowner the contract price.

DISCUSSION
Section 362(a)'s automatic stay, activated at the petition's
filing, enjoins a debtor's prebankruptcy creditors from pursuing
a comprehensive array of actions aimed at establishing or
collecting a debtor's prepetition liabilities.3

2

The stay "is

The State asked that Nelson be permanently enjoined

from:
a.
telephoning, writing letters to, or in any way
soliciting persons who own land in Maine with respect to
harvesting or selectively cutting their wood, timber or trees;
b. making misrepresentations in violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act; and
C. violating the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act....
(State of Maine Mot. at 2; see also Ex. A, Superior Court
Complaint at 8).
3

As applicable to this dispute,

section 362(a) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of (1)
the commencement or continuation, including
the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against
2

intended to give the debtor breathing room,"

Soares v. Brockton

Credit Union

(In re Soares). 107 F.3d 969, 975

"effect[ing]

an immediate freeze of the status quo at the outset

of the

(1st Cir. 1997),

[bankruptcy] proceeding, by precluding and nullifying most

postpetition actions and proceedings against the debtor in
nonbankruptcy fora, judicial or nonjudicial, as well as most
extrajudicial acts against the debtor, or affecting property in
which the debtor, or the debtors1s estate, has a legal, equitable
or possessory interest."

Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes

Transp.. I n c .. 931 F.2d 984, 987

(1st Cir. 1991).

A longstanding exception to the automatic stay's substantial
reach provides that governmental units are not enjoined from
taking actions to enforce their "police powers."*
4*
3
2
6

Set forth in

the debtor that was or could have been commenced before
the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against
property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of
the estate or of property from the estate or to
exercise control over property of the estate;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title [.]
§ 362 (a) (1) , (2) (3) , (6) .
4
" [T]he bankruptcy court is not a haven for wrongdoers.
The policy of the Code is to permit regulatory, police and
criminal actions to proceed in spite of section 3 6 2 (a)(1), and to
permit enforcement of resulting judgments or orders, other than
money judgments, in spite of section 362(a)(2)."
2 Collier on
Bankruptcy, f 363.05 [5] [a] (15th 3d. Rev. 1999).
The First
Circuit has stated that the police and regulatory power exception
coupled with 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)'s requirement that court
3

§ 362(b)(4), the "police and regulatory power exception"
currently provides5 that the injunctive provisions of § 3 6 2 (a) do
not operate to stay:
the commencement or continuation of an action or
proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such
governmental unit's . . . police and regulatory power,
including the enforcement of a judgment other than a
money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by
the governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's . . . police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C.

§ 3 6 2 (b)(4).6

Nelson concedes that the State of Maine is a "governmental
unit" and that,

in pursuing the civil action now pending in the

appointed trustees, receivers, or managers undertake their charge
in accordance with State laws "indicate[s] strongly that the
automatic stay should not be used as a shield against the
application and enforcement of valid state and local laws."
Cournover v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir. 1986).
See also Penn Terra Ltd, v. Department of E n v t l . Resources. 733
F.2d 267, 271-74 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussion of the legislative
history of the police and regulatory power exception to the stay
(prior to the 1999 revisions)).
The 1999 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
amended § 362(b)(4) in three ways: former subsections (b)(4) and
(b)(5) were combined; language was inserted into the introductory
clause to provide expressly that the exception applies to actions
otherwise falling under § 3 6 2 ( a ) (3) and (6); and organizations
operating under the Chemical Weapons Convention were expressly
identified as entitled to invoke § 362(b)(4).
The reworking
created "apparently unintentional ambiguities, which are best
resolved by reference to the pre-amendment version." 2 Colliers
on Bankruptcy, supra, f 362.05[5][b].
6
The exception of § 3 6 2 (b)(4) applies only to actions
falling under the purview of subsections § 362 ( a ) (1),(2),(3), or
(6). See § 3 6 2 (b)(4); § 3 6 3 (a). See also supra notes 3 and 5.
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state court it is enforcing its police and regulatory power.7
Indeed,

362(b)(4)'s application to the State's efforts to obtain

injunctive relief is straightforward.
Ltd.. 733 F.2d 267

S e e . e .g ., Penn Terra

(in an action against debtor for violations of

environmental laws by a state agency resulting in an injunction
requiring debtor to perform certain remedial acts, court
concluded action was excepted from the stay, rejecting the
argument that it was enforcement of a money judgment clothed as
injunctive relief); see also Cournover, 790 F.2d 971

(town's

enforcement of its zoning laws by removing used truck parts from
debtor's property -

stored there in violation of a consent

decree, town zoning laws, and a court order on contempt charges was excepted from the stay).
Section § 362(b)(4)'s application to the State's efforts to
establish penalties or fines for Nelson's statutory infractions
is also plain.
Okla.

1996)

See, e .g ., Maritan v. T o d d , 203 B.R. 740

(N.D.

(Rule 11 sanctions against debtor/attorney excepted

from the stay); NLRB v. Sawulski. 158 B.R. 971

(E.D. Mich.

1993)(contempt proceedings including fines excepted from stay);
United States v. Armory Hotel Assocs., 93 B.R. 1 (D. Me. 1988)
(United State's action to reduce to judgment penalties for
violation of the record-keeping requirements of the immigration
laws falls within the § 362(b)(4) exception).
But Nelson argues that the automatic stay does forestall the
State's attempt to obtain an order for restitution.

As he sees

7
This concession averts the necessity of delving into
the "pecuniary purpose" test or the "public policy" test for
determining whether the State is acting with the requisite
§ 3 6 2 (b)(4) purpose in its action against Nelson.
See Eddleman
v. United States Dept, of Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 790-91 (10th Cir.
1991) (describing the alternative tests).
5

it, that attempt turns on transactions with each landowner and
the damages for which each landowner asserts he is liable.
Nelson points out that he has listed the landowners as creditors
in his schedules and that he intends to challenge such claims as
they may file.

He apprehends that the State may amend its

complaint to allege his misconduct in connections with others
whom he has listed as creditors.

He objects to what he sees as

the State's attempt to "export" those disputes to the state
court, contending they are part and parcel of his Chapter 13
case.
The State responds that although it may rely upon Nelson's
transactions with landowner/creditors as evidence of a proper
measure of restitution, its efforts are aimed at establishing a
pattern of unlawful conduct and obtaining an appropriate order
for restitution.8

It will litigate statutory/regulatory issues,

not contract claims.
I agree with the State that it is free to litigate its
dispute with Nelson in state court, bankruptcy notwithstanding.

I

concur with the holding articulated by Judge Murphy in nearly
identical circumstances:

8
The State does not seek relief from stay to enforce any
money judgment it may obtain.
In fact, it expects that such
payment as it may exact will be obtained through Nelson's Chapter
13 plan. S e e . e .a ., Cisneros v. Cost Control M k t g . and Sales
Management of Virginia, Inc., 862 F .Supp. 1531, 1534 n.3 (W.D.
Va. 1994); Maritan, 203 B.R. at 744. See also Eddleman. 923 F.2d
at 791 (observing that the debtors' back-pay claimants would not
achieve "any extra priority" as the result of the D O L 's unstayed
action because the collection of the back-pay claims would
"proceed according to normal bankruptcy procedures") .
Of course, how the State's potential restitution claim
should be treated under Nelson's plan and how the State's
distribution of restitution among Nelson's creditors would impact
those creditors' Chapter 13 claims are issues for another day.
6

In the instant case, Movant is, without question,
a governmental unit.
The gravamen of Movant's
Complaint is an action to stop consumer fraud.
Movant
seeks an injunction, imposition of a fine, and payment
of restitution, all of which appear to be aimed at
enforcing Movant's regulatory power.
Movant's
complaint does not seek recompense for any pecuniary
damage it suffered at the hands of Debtor.
Nor does
Movant seek to enforce third parties' contracts with
Debtor.
A proceeding which seeks restitution is not
deprived of the applicability of exceptions to the
automatic stay merely because restitution bears a
direct relationship to actual pecuniary losses.
See,
In re Whitaker, 16 B.R. 917 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re
Farrell, 43 B.R. 115 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
The Complaint
shows that Movant's purpose in filing the state court
proceeding was to enforce governmental regulatory
powers, not to collect a debt.
Therefore, § 362( b ) (4)
is applicable to except Movant's lawsuit from the
operation of the automatic stay.
State of Georgia v. Family Vending,
Inc.), 171 B.R. 907, 909

(In re Family Vending,

(Bankr. N.D. G a . 1994). See also

Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 790-91
against debtor,

Inc.

(DOL's enforcement proceedings

seeking debarment and liquidation of back-pay

claims "was but another method of enforcing the policies
underlying the

[Service Contract A c t ] " and was not "an assertion

of private rights");

Cost Control M k t g . And Sales Management of

Virginia. 862 F.Supp. at 1533

(HUD's action,

seeking restitution

and disgorgement, against debtor for violations of the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act was a "suit for the purpose of
punishing the defendants for fraudulent practices and deterring
any similar conduct in the future," falling within the police or
regulatory power exception to the stay); Ahrens Aircraft,
NLRB, 703 F.2d 23

Inc, v.

(1st Cir. 1983)(enforcement of NLRB's back pay

order excepted from the stay); SEC v. Towers Fin, C o r p ., 205 B.R.
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)(SEC action against debtor seeking disgorgement
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of investor funds, as well as injunctive relief, was excepted
from the stay as an exercise of police and regulatory powers,
rejecting debtor's argument that SEC was seeking a pecuniary
benefit); Ngan Gung Restaurant,
Naan Gung Restaurant,

Inc, v. State of New York

(In re

Inc.), 183 B.R. 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1995) (state's action for restitution of unpaid employee wages and
tips against debtor/employer was excepted from the stay,
rejecting the debtor's contention that the restitution was akin
to private collection efforts, concluding that the relief was a
method of enforcing the policy underlying the labor laws).9

Nelson attempts to distinguish Family Vending, Inc.,
and cases like it, because it was a no-asset Chapter 7 case.
The
effort is unconvincing. Section 3 6 2 (b)(4) applies unqualifiedly
to Chapter 13. See § 103(a). The impact of the police and
regulatory exception on the assets of the estate and, thus, the
status of a case as a liquidation versus a reorganization does
not play a role in my determination of whether the exception
applies.
See, e , g , , Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 790 (rejecting
District court's conclusion that the "police and regulatory
power" exception did not apply to actions interfering with the
bankruptcy court's control over the Chapter 11 assets, assuming
that Congress chose not to so qualify the exception "with the
full recognition that the exception would allow governmental
actions to encroach on the court's control of debtors' affairs") ,Penn Terra Lt d . . 733 F.2d at 278 ("In enacting the exceptions to
section 362, Congress recognized that in some circumstances,
bankruptcy policy must yield to higher priorities."); Maritan.
203 B.R. at 744 (applying § 362(b)(4) in a Chapter 13 case,
concluding that there is no limitation on the police and
regulatory power exception for instances in which the
governmental action interferes with the administration of the
debtor's assets); Sawulski, 158 B.R. 971 (applying exception in a
Chapter 13 case with respect to contempt of court proceedings
involving confinement and fines); In re Ngan Gung Restaurant,
I n c .), 183 B.R. 689 (straightforwardly applying the exception in
a chapter 11 reorganization); see also Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. MCorp, 502 U.S. 32, 37-42 (1991)
(police and regulatory powers exception embraced two
administrative proceedings by the Federal Reserve System against
8

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

I conclude that the State

of Maine's pending civil lawsuit against the debtor is within
§ 362(b)(4)'s exception to the automatic stay and, therefore, may
proceed without further order of this court.
A separate order shall issue forthwith.

debtor for violations of the Federal Reserve Act and "source of
strength" regulations, even though a determination unfavorable to
the debtor could impact the bankruptcy estate; suggesting in the
latter event that the bankruptcy court exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction); c f . O ’Hara Coro, v. F/V North Star, 212 B.R. 1, 3(D. Me. 199 7 ) ("Courts have begun to recognize that disparate
treatment is contrary to the language and purpose of the stay.
... 'The plain language of the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code applies equally to liquidations and
reorganizations.'" (quoting United States v. LeBouf Bros. Towing
C o . . 45 B.R. 887, 889-90 (E.D. La. 1985)).
cc:

Debtor
Peter Fessenden, Esq.
Linda Conti, Esq.
U.S. Trustee
Donald Gasink, Esq.
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
GERALD NELSON, JR.,

)
)

Defendant

)
)

DECISION AND ORDER

)
This matter is before the court on the State's complaint alleging violations of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act,
32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661 et. seq. The plaintiff seeks injunctive relief1, civil penalties for
intentional violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act, restitution for consumers as well
as its costs including attorney's fees.
The defendant, Gerald Nelson, Jr. was notified o f the trial date in this case and
failed to appear.
FIN D IN G S O F FACT
In May of 1996, Gerald Mulvey, a Rhode Island resident received a letter in the
mail from Gerald Nelson. Nelson wrote M ulvey about his woodlot in Otisfield, Maine.
Nelson told Mulvey: "I have a small logging business and would like to do some
Selective Cutting on your land. I do very good work, and offer fair prices for the wood. I
see there is a lot o f Selective Cutting that could be done to turn your lot into a healthy
forest." As a result o f the letter, Mr. M ulvey and his wife called Nelson and arranged to

1 Nelson agreed to the entry of a preliminary injunction in June 2000.

meet near the property to discuss the matter. In June o f 1996 they met in Maine. At that
meeting Nelson told them that he would pay them $1,500 per week from the harvest for
ten weeks. The Mulveys made no decision at the meeting and returned to Rhode Island.
Later that month, Nelson called and asked them if they had made a decision about the
harvest. At that time the Mulveys agreed to permit Nelson to selectively harvest the
wood on their Otisfield property. This agreement was verbal. There was no written
contract.
The harvest began on the Mulvey property. On June 27, 1996, Mr. Mulvey called
Nelson to arrange a meeting with him in Otisfield. Nelson agreed to meet with him on
June 29, 1996. When Mr. Mulvey arrived, Nelson's equipment was on the lot, but Nelson
did not arrive.
On July 1, 1996, Mr. Mulvey called Nelson's residence and spoke with Mrs.
Nelson. Nelson returned his call that evening and told him that there was a check in the
mail. On July 5, 1996, Mr. Mulvey had not yet received a check so he called Nelson and
left a message on his answering machine. On July 6, 1996, Mr. Mulvey called Nelson
and told him to stop cutting until he received a check. He arranged to meet with Nelson
at the Otisfield property on July 8. When he arrived at the Otisfield lot in the early
morning of July 8, 1996, Nelson's equipment was gone. Nelson never arrived for the
meeting. Mr. Mulvey testified that he had slips establishing that Nelson harvested $19,
498 worth o f wood from his land. While Norris W illette, a wood broker, paid Gerald
Nelson, Jr. $8,284.88 for wood harvested from a lot in Otisfield owned by "Gerard" from
June 24 through 28, 1996. Mr. Mulvey has never received any payment for the wood
Nelson harvested.
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Laurian Sherman resides in Rockport, Maine and owns a woodlot in West
Rockport. Gerald Nelson, Jr. contacted her and requested permission to harvest wood on
her property. In September or October o f 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Sherman met with Nelson
at the property. She walked the lot with Nelson and told him that the land is adjacent to
land owned by the local water company near Mirror Lake which is the drinking water
supply. There are a number o f streams on the property and Nelson told her he would not
start cutting until the ground was frozen. Mrs. Sherman pointed out large hemlock trees
that she did not want cut. Following the meeting, she expected Nelson to follow up with
a specific proposal. In the meantime she hired a forester to create a management plan for
the property.
In November of 1996 she learned that Nelson was harvesting her wood when she
received a call from the water company and the Department of Environmental Protection
informing her that the logging operation on her property was polluting Mirror Lake. She
went to the property and saw that the large hemlocks, which she had asked Nelson not to
cut, were gone. As a result o f Mr. N elson’s conduct, Mrs. Sherman has suffered a loss in
the ability to enjoy her land, and the land has decreased in marketability. The Shermans
have spent $4,500 to remedy the damage caused by Nelson's logging operation. While
the total value of wood taken from the property is unknown, Norris Willette paid Gerald
Nelson, Jr. $3, 458.59 for wood owned by "Lorriann" near Mirror Lake. The Sherman’s
received one check for $600.
Harry Harden is a N ew Hampshire resident. He owns a woodlot in Damariscotta,
Maine. In February of 1998, he received a letter from Gerald Nelson, Jr. in which Nelson
offered to selectively harvest his woodlot to "improve the quality of [your] land for the
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future.” Nelson also stated that he offered fair prices for the wood. Mr. Harden
responded to Nelson by writing him and asking which o f his properties in Damariscotta
N elson proposed to harvest. Mr. Harden then received a phone call from Nelson in early
March o f 1998. They discussed the wood harvest and agreed to meet at the property in
Maine on March 5, 1998 to discuss it further.
Mr. Harden then called a friend who is an attorney and who resides in
Damariscotta. This friend told Mr. Harden that he had had a client who had sued Mr.
Nelson. After receiving this information, Mr. Harden called Nelson to cancel the March
5, 1998 meeting. He was surprised the next week to receive a check from Nelson for
$1,535. He never gave N elson permission to harvest any wood. Mr. Harden did not cash
the check. He contacted the authorities. Robbins Lumber, Inc. paid Gerald Nelson, Jr.
$8,661.96 for wood harvested on March 3 through 5, 1998 from a woodlot in Lincoln
County owned by Harden. Mr. Harden has never been compensated for the wood
harvested from his property.
Janice Bartlett lives in Topsham, Maine. Her family owns a woodlot in Topsham
near her home. She received a letter from Nelson offering "to do some Selective Cutting"
on the lot and to pay "fair prices for the wood." The family discussed the possibility of
having the lot harvested. She had several phone calls with Nelson and he and his wife
met with her at her home. She walked the lot with him. He told her that he would
selectively cut the lot and that he would remove damaged trees. He emphasized that her
lot would look like a state part when he was done. He also told her that she would be
paid $40,000 to $50,000 for the wood. She asked for references and checked them.
Nothing aroused her suspicions. She entered into a written contract for the harvest o f the
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wood in December of 1998. Nelson began the harvest in early 1999. Mrs. Bartlett
visited the lot often and asked why it did not look like a state park. Nelson harvested
many more trees that she had understood would be the case. In the summer of 1999 she
received a notice that Nelson had filed for bankruptcy. This news, along with the
extensive cutting, upset Mrs. Bartlett. In September of 1999 she terminated the
harvesting operation.
Also in September o f 1999, Merle Ring, who is a licensed forester employed by
the Maine Forest Service, toured the Bartlett lot. Mr. Ring, along with a team of forest
rangers, performed a stump cruise of the lot in October 1999. He calculated the volumes
o f wood taken by species, product and value. Using the 1998 average stumpage prices
for Sagadahoc County as published by the Maine Forest Service, he conservatively
calculated that the landowner should have received $24,768 in stumpage money for the
wood taken. However, under the terms of the contract Nelson agreed to pay Mrs. Bartlett
between $40,000 and $50,000. She received a total of $14,000.
Richard Marsden received a letter from Gerald Nelson, Jr. in which Nelson
offered to selectively harvest his woodlot in Swanville, Maine. At the time, Mr. Marsden
lived in Massachusetts. Subsequently, Mr. Marsden m oved to Maine. He received a
second letter from Nelson in which Nelson expressed an interest in performing a
"selective cut" and stated that trees damaged by the ice storm of 1998 should be removed.
Marsden agreed and entered into a contract with Nelson in March o f 1999. The harvest
was conducted from March through August o f 1999. Mr. Marsden did not receive
payment for the wood that was being harvested. He stopped the harvest in August and
hired Mr. William Calderwood, a licensed forester to assess the lot. Mr. Calderwood
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performed a stump tally. He opined that based upon the species and size of trees cut, the
objective o f the harvest was to remove the largest and most valuable trees. This type of
harvest is typically called "high-grading.” Mr. Calderwood ascertained from his
observation of the harvest that it was unlikely that the pine trees, which accounts for most
o f the value and volume removed from the Marsden lot, suffered serious damage in the
ice storm.
Mr. Calderwood determined that the wood harvested from Mr. Marsden's lot is
worth $614 pursuant to the contract prices offered by Nelson. The wood is
conservatively worth $2,898 according to the most recent stumpage prices maintained by
the Maine Forest Service. Mr. Marsden received a check for $263 from Nelson.
Gary Baker resides in Kentucky. He owns a woodlot in Augusta, Maine. He
works in the paper industry and travels to Maine often. In August of 1999, he received a
letter from Gerald Nelson. Mr. Baker's oldest daughter had started college that fall so he
felt that he could use the money from a wood harvest. He sent Nelson an email and
spoke with him on the phone. He asked Nelson to give him an estimate o f the amount
that he would receive in stumpage. Nelson assured Baker that Baker would receive
$17,000 for the stumpage.
Understanding that the harvest would be selective, taking only 40% of the mature
trees and that he would receive $17,000, Baker entered into a contract with Nelson for the
harvest of his woodlot in September of 1999. Baker learned that the harvest had begun
when he received a call from a neighboring landowner. The harvest began in December
o f 1999. In January of 2000, Mr. Baker was in Maine on business so he called Nelson.
Nelson met with him and gave him a check for $2,700. Nelson assured Mr. Baker that
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more checks would be coming. However, Mr. Baker never received another check from
Nelson. He called him numerous times. On two occasions Nelson agreed to meet Mr.
Baker in Maine to pay him for the wood. N elson did not appear at either meeting.
Patty Cormier, a licensed forester employed by the Maine Forest Service
performed a stump cruise of the Baker property. She determined that the average volume
o f harvested forest products for the lot is 400 cords, and the average value is $17,306.
W esley Lewis lives in Whitman, Massachusetts. He owns a woodlot in Harrison,
Maine. Mr. Lewis received a letter from Nelson offering to selectively cut his wood and
to pay a reasonable price for the wood. Mr. Lewis thought that Nelson was going to
improve the woodlot. Nelson harvested the woodlot in the fall o f 1999. Nelson made a
m ess on the lot, spilling fuel and destroying road improvements, which upset Mr. Lewis.
Forester Merle Ring performed a stump cruise o f the lot. Mr. Lewis' lot had a
considerable amount o f oak veneer on it which is a particularly high value wood. Based
on the cruise and using values from the most recent state published stumpage price list
and log and veneer specs and prices from Bear Paw Lumber Company, where some of
the logs were taken, Mr. Ring estimated that the value o f the sawlogs and pulp taken from
the Lewis lot to be $24,841.00. He further estimated that the oak veneer taken from lot is
worth $5,089.00, for a total o f $29, 930.00. Mr. L ew is’ driveway was also destroyed as a
result of Mr. N elson’s activities at a cost o f $3,000. Mr. Lewis was paid $2,171.
Gerald Nelson, Jr. contacted Brenda Koukol o f Plainville, Massachusetts about
harvesting a woodlot that she owns in Harrison, Maine. Nelson told her that she would
be paid $9,000 from the harvest. She requested that he provide references. He provided
references and she agreed verbally to let the harvest begin in April of 2000. After the
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harvest was underway for a couple of weeks, Ms. Koukol tried to contact Nelson to find
out where her payment was. He was unresponsive. She told him to stop cutting. Merle
Ring later performed a stump cruise o f the valuable white pine lot and conservatively
estimated the harvest to be worth $5,813. Nelson sent Ms. Koukol one check for $1,112.
In the summer o f 2000, Don Atkinson of Portland received a letter from Nelson
offering to selectively cut trees on a woodlot owned by his father in Skowhegan. Mr.
Atkinson's father had to go into a nursing home. Mr. Atkinson has power of attorney for
his father. Nelson promised to pay Mr. Atkinson $3,200 for his father's wood. Mr.
Atkinson also told Nelson that he did not want the lot to be clear-cut and that he
understood that Nelson would be responsible for cleaning up the lot. Nelson harvested
the lot. He never paid Mr. Atkinson and did not clean up the lot. Mr. Atkinson called
Nelson more than 75 times, but Nelson never returned his calls.
Warren Evans lives in Windham, Maine. He also owns land in Sumner, Maine.
In July of 2000 he received a letter from Nelson who expressed an interest in selectively
harvesting the lot in Sumner. Mr. Evans did not want the Sumner lot harvested. In
response to the letter, Mr. Evans emailed a message to Nelson telling him that he was not
interested in having the Sumner lot harvested but that he did need some trees cut on his
Windham land. Nelson told Mr. Evans that he preferred to work without a written
contract. Mr. Evans prepared an outline o f his understanding o f what Nelson would be
harvesting. The outline specified that Nelson was to remove certain trees along with the
stumps. In return Nelson was to be allowed to take five loads o f timber from the
property.
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Nelson did not remove the stumps and he kept removing loads of timber. Mr.
Evans questioned Nelson about how much wood he was cutting. Nelson told him not to
worry that he would be paid $12,000 to $15,000. When his disregard for the terms of the
agreement became clear, Mr. Evans became nervous. Nelson cut pines in violation of the
75-foot setback requirements from the river and he damaged power lines. Mr. Evans
asked for Nelson's insurance information. He contacted the insurance company and was
told that the policy did not cover damages to landowner's property by Nelson's logging
operation. Mr. Evans asked Nelson to leave the property. Nelson did not leave. He kept
cutting wood. Mr. Evans called the police. After the police arrived Nelson eventually
left. Mr. Evans was never paid by Nelson. In fact, Mr. Evans had to hire third parties at
higher prices to clean up the mess made by Nelson, and to refurbish damage to his road
and lawn. Mr. Evans was paid $6,000 for wood removed from his property.
Michael Hic-Quinn lives in Portland, Maine and owns a woodlot in Augusta. He
has made several improvements including a pond which he stocks with fish. Nelson
contacted him about harvesting wood from the lot. Nelson promised to pay him every
week. In January 2001 Mr. Hic-Quinn entered into a written contract with Nelson for a
harvest of the woodlot. This agreement came after Nelson agreed to a preliminary
injunction in June o f 2000. Yet the terms o f this agreement alone violate paragraphs 1, 2,
3, & 5 of the injunction. Subsequently, the lot was harvested in the winter of 2001. Mr.
Hic-Quinn testified that the wood taken from his land was worth at least $20,000. Mr.
Hic-Quin also suffered an unspecified amount o f damage to his property and landscape as
a result of N elson’s activities. He has never received any payment.
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C O N CLU SIO N S OF LAW
Two general issues are presented to the court. First, has the defendant engaged in
unfair and deceptive trade practices and second, has he violated the Consumer
Solicitations Sales Act.
The Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 provides that unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are declared unlawful. Gerald Nelson, Jr. hass engaged in trade and
commerce by promoting and offering his services as a logger. In construing the Act, this
court must be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and
the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) o f the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1)). See 5 M.R.S.A. § 207(1). A practice is deceptive if it has the tendency or
capacity to deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances about a
material fact. See generally Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdaie Associates, 103 FTC 110, 174, et seq. (1984).
Gerald Nelson deceived every consumer in this case about two material
facts. First, he misrepresented the nature and the extent of the harvest that he conducted.
In each case he told the consumer that he would selectively harvest the wood. Every
consumer understood this to mean that he would take some but not all of the trees in a
manner that would preserve the ability to perform another harvest in the future. In each
case the consumer relied on this understanding when he or she agreed to allow the
harvest. A lso in every instance Nelson did not selectively harvest the lot in accordance
with the landowner's understanding. He performed a high-grade harvest taking more
wood than he said he would take and in some instances taking trees that he was
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specifically told not to take. Every consumer testified that the selective nature of the
harvest was material to his or her decision to go forward with the harvest.
Second, Gerald Nelson deceived every landowner with respect to the price he
would pay for the wood. He promised everyone "fair" or "reasonable" payment. He
promised some o f the landowners specific dollar amounts. In many instances, Gerald
Nelson, Jr. paid nothing. In other instances, he made nominal payments that were far less
than the fair value o f the wood.
The consumers acted reasonably. They all met with Nelson or had conversations
with him prior to entering into the agreement. He was prompt and responsive to every
customer contact prior to commencing the harvest. Many consumers had written
contracts. Two landowners, Harry Harden and Laurian Sherman never even consented to
have Nelson cut their wood.
Nelson intentionally deceived the landowners by promising them selective harvest
and fair payment, neither o f which he delivered. He engaged in this practice from at least
1996 through 2001, even after he consented to the entry o f a preliminary injunction
enjoining such practices. After he harvested the wood, he avoided consumers who called
to ask about payment. He did not answer his phone. He did not return messages. He did
not show up at prearranged meetings with landowners.
Gerald Nelson, Jr. has also violated the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act, 32
M .R.S.A. § 4661 through 4670. Pursuant to this Act:
Where merchandise is sold or contracted to be sold, whether under a
single contract or under multiple contracts, to a consumer as a result of or
in connection with a salesman's direct contact accomplished by means of
and including, but not limited to, a personal visit or a telephone call upon
the consumer, other than at the seller's place o f business, without the
consumer soliciting the initial contact, the contract shall be in writing, bear
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the signature of the seller and the consumer, contain the date of the
transaction, the terms of the sale or offer, the name and the mailing
address o f the seller’s permanent place o f business, a statement of the
consumer's right to avoid as provided in this subchapter
32 M .R.S.A. § 4662. Sections 4663 and 4664 require the seller to notify the consumer in
writing o f his right to cancel the contract by providing written notice of avoidance to the
seller within three full business days follow ing the day on which the contract was made.
"Merchandise" is defined to include services for purposes of this statute. 32 M.R.S.A. §
4661(2).
Gerald Nelson Jr. contacted all o f the eleven consumers by sending a letter
offering his services. He met with the consumers who responded to the mail at the
consumers' homes. None of the consumers initiated contact with Nelson at his place of
business. All o f the consumers were solicited by mail and by personal visit at their
homes or woodlots which is not Nelson's usual place of business. Some consumers were
not given a written contract. Those consumers that had written contracts did not have a
three-day right to cancel. Violations o f the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act constitute
violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670.
Upon finding violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the court has
considerable discretion to fashion appropriate remedies to do complete justice. State v.
Bob Chambers Ford, 522 A. 2d 362, 366 (1987). Section 209 of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act provides for restitution for consumers harmed by defendant's unlawful
practices and a $10,000 civil penalty for each intentional violation o f the Act. The Court
finds eleven intentional violations o f the Act and accordingly imposes a civil penalty of
$10,000 per each, for a total civil penalty of $110,000.
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Gerald Mulvey

2.

Laurian Sherman

$7,958

3.

Harry Harden

$8,662

4.

Janice Bartlett

$26,000

5.

Richard Marsden

6.

Gary Baker

$14,300

7.

W esley Lewis

$30,219

8.

Brenda Koukol

$7,888

9.

Don Atkinson

$3,200

10.

Warren Evans

$6,000

11.

Michael Hic-Quinn

t o

c o

n

s u

m

e r s

a s

f o l l o w

s :

$19,498

$2,635

$20,000

The court believes that permanent injunctive relief is also necessary.
1.

Gerald Nelson, Jr., his agents, servants, officers, employees, and attorneys,

and those persons in active concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of
this Order are permanently enjoined from:
(a) engaging in or pursuing any home solicitation sales; and
(b) making any direct contact with customers or potential customers at any
place other than at Gerald Nelson Jr.’s permanent place of business, as
defined by the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act 32 §4661(2-A),
without the customer or potential customer soliciting the initial contact
independently from any actions taken by Gerald Nelson Jr.; and
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(c) the use o f any business name without first notifying the Department of
the Attorney General; and
(d) entering into any agreements to provide any wood harvesting services
without first creating a written contract containing each of the
provisions listed herein. Any agreement that does not conform to the
content, disclosure and procedure requirements herein shall be void;
and
(e) making any oral or written representations to woodlot owners that
mislead or confuse customers as to their unconditional right to avoid
any contract entered into; and
(f) making any oral or written representations to woodlot owners that
mislead or confuse customers as to the nature and extent of the harvest
to be performed, or the value o f the wood to be harvested and the
amount to be paid for the wood harvested in violation of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act, 5. M.R.S.A. § 207; and
(g) beginning performance of any such contract for the harvesting o f wood
so long as the customer has a right to cancel or avoid. At a minimum,
performance o f any wood harvesting contract shall not begin until a
period o f three full business days after the date upon, which the
contract was agreed to has expired.
2.

Gerald Nelson, Jr., his agents, servants, officers, employees, and attorneys,

and those persons in active concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of
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to harvesting, which meets the following requirements:
(a) any written contract created pursuant to this Order must contain a clear
and conspicuous disclosure that states:
LICENSED FO RESTER S A R E A VA ILABL E FOR
HIRE TO A SSESS YO UR W O O D L O T FOR
H A R VESTIN G . Y O U CAN O B T A IN A LIST OF
LICENSED FO RESTER S A N D TH E M O ST R ECEN T
STUM PAGE PR ICES BY C O N TAC TING T H E
M AINE FO R E ST SER VIC E A T STA TE H O USE
STA TIO N #22, A UG USTA , M A IN E 04333 (207) 2872791 OR INSTA TE 1-800-367-0223; and
(b) any written contract created pursuant to this Order must
contain a clear and conspicuous disclosure that states:
GERALD N E L SO N JR. HAS B E E N FO UN D BY A
COURT OF L A W TO HAVE V IO LAT ED TH E
M AINE U N FA IR TRADE PR A C T IC E S A CT AND
THE C O N SU M E R SO L IC IT A T IO N SALES A C T BY
EN G A G ING IN D EC EPTIV E, A ND FR A U D U LEN T
BUSINESS PR A CTIC ES PU R SU A N T TO 5 M .R .S.A . §
207 A ND 32 M .R.S.A . §§ 4661-4671. A C O N SU M ER
LAW GUIDE IS A V A ILA BL E FR O M THE ST A T E
OF M A IN E , D EPA RTM ENT O F A TTO R NE Y
G ENERAL BY CALLING (207) 626-8849; and
(c) any written contract created pursuant to this Order must clearly and
conspicuously state:
YOU M AY A V O ID THIS C O N TRA C T BY G IV IN G
W R ITTEN N O T IC E OF A V O ID A N C E TO G ER A LD
N ELSO N , JR. B Y O R D IN A RY M AIL, PO STA G E
PREPAID, W ITH IN 3 (T H R EE) FULL BU SIN ESS
DAYS FO LLO W IN G T H E D A Y TH E C O N TRA C T
W AS M A D E. N O TIC E TO G ER A LD N E L SO N JR.
OF A V O ID A N C E IS EFFECTIV E UPON D EPO SIT
IN T H E U N ITED STATES M AIL; and
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(d) any written contract created pursuant to this Order must contain the
following clear and conspicuous statement, as well as the landowner’s
signature attesting that:
I H A V E READ A N D U N D E R ST A N D TH A T GERALD
N E L SO N JR. HAS V IO L A T E D THE M AINE UNFAIR
TR AD E PR A CTIC ES A CT AS W ELL AS THE
C O NSUM ER SO L IC IT A T IO N SALES ACT
BEC AU SE OF HIS W O O D LO T H A R VESTIN G
PRACTICES. I U N D E R ST A N D THAT THE PRICE I
W ILL BE PAID FO R ANY W O O D H A R VESTED
FR O M MY LAND W ILL BE EQ U A L T O OR
G R EA TER TH A N T H E STU M PA G E PR ICE SE T IN
TH E M AINE FO R E ST SER VIC E STU M PA G E
PR ICE GUIDE F O R T H E AREA IN W H ICH M Y
W O O DLO T LIES. I A LSO U ND ER ST AN D M Y
R IG H T TO A V O ID T H IS C O NTRACT PURSUANT
TO T H E TERM S ST A T E D H EREIN.
The disclosures required by this Order are “clear and conspicuous” so long
as they appear in fourteen point boldface type.
3.

Gerald Nelson, Jr., his agents, servants, officers, employees, and attorneys,

and those persons in active concert or participation with him who receive actual notice of
this Order are further required to:
(a) set all contract prices for any woodlot harvesting services at a value
equal to or greater than the prices contained in the most recent Maine
Forest Service stumpage price guide for the area in which the
landowner’s woodlot lies; and
(b) provide customers with an accounting o f all wood harvested from their
woodlot, which shall include accurate and true scale slips for the wood
harvested as well as a copy o f the most recent Maine Forrest Service
stumpage price guide for the area and type o f wood harvested; and

(c) retain a copy of each written contract and all written disclosures made
to woodlot owners with whom he contracts to harvest wood for a
period o f three years, and to make these records available for
examination by the Department o f the Attorney General upon request.
This Order is effective.
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

)
)
)
)

GERALD NELSON, JR.,

)
)
)
)

Defendant

)
)

v.

)
PLAINTIFF’S W ITNESS LIST
Plaintiff, State o f Maine, submits the following Witness and Exhibit List.
WITNESSES
1.

Detective Richard O. Fairfield, Jr., 286 Water Street, 7th Floor, Augusta,

Maine 04333-0006.
2.

Jim McMullen, District Forester, Maine Forest Service, RR1, Box 650,

Augusta, Maine 04330.
3.

Matthew Gomes, Forest Ranger, Maine Forest Service, RR1, Box 908,

Jefferson, Maine.
4.

Vernon Westcott, 26 Brighton Street, Belmont, Massachusetts 02178.

5.

Merle Ring, District Forester, Maine Forest Service, 131 Bethel Road,

West Paris, Maine 04289.
6.

Allen Pittsley, 23 Myricks Street, Berkley, Massachusetts 02779.

7.

Gordon Moore, District Forester, Maine Forest Service, P.O. Box 259,

Lee, Maine 04455.

8.

Frank Vaccaro, 130 Ray Street, Garfield, New Jersey 07026.

9.

Roger Ryder, District Forester, P.O. Box 1107, Greenville, Maine 04441.

10.

John Leavitt, Forest Ranger, Maine Forest Service, Gray, Maine 04039.

11.

Steven Elliot, Licensed Forester, RFD1, Box 1760, North Monmouth,

Maine 04265.
12.

David Schaible, Licensed Forester, P.O. Box 126, Back Meadow Road,

Nobleboro, Maine 04555.
13.

William T. Newcomb, Consulting Forester, RFD1, Box 3812, Norway,

Maine 04268.
14.

Gary Morse, District Forester, Maine Forest Service, P.O. B ox 1107,

Greenville, Maine 04441.
15.

Robert Hoke, 23 Hawthorne Avenue, Staten Island, N ew York 10314.

16.

Thomas Bethea, 17 Maple W ood Lane, Unit 203, Madison, W isconsin

17.

Walter Armstrong, Maine Licensed Consulting Forester, 74 Montsweag

53704.

Road, W oolwich, Maine 04579.
18.

William B. Calderwood, Licensed Forester, 73 Northport Avenue, Belfast,

Maine 04915.
19.

Richard Marsden, Route 141, Swanville, Maine 04915.

20.

Frederick R. Fischer, 8317 Prince George Road, Charlotte, North Carolina

21.

Mark Vanner, Licensed Forester, Robbins Lumber, Searsmont, Maine

28210.

04973.
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22.

Patty Cormier, Licensed Forester, Maine Forest Service, 536 Waldoboro

Road, Jefferson, Maine 04348.
23.

Mary Ellen Nelson, 145 Smithton Road, Freedom, Maine 04941.

24.

Harry Harden, 14 Clark Island Road, Amherst, New Hampshire 03031.

25.

Kenneth Butler, Log Buyer, Robbins Lumber, Inc., Searsmont, Maine

26.

Donald Hewson, 21 Turnip Hill, Northport, New York 11768.

27.

Forrest and Laurianne Sherman, 1580 County Road, Rockport, Maine

28.

Francis Gagnon, 83 Grey Road, Cumberland, Maine 04021.

29.

Gerald Mulvey, 211 Old Mountain Trail, Richmond, Rhode Island 02892.

30.

Judith Curtis, 17 Everett Avenue, Winchester, Massachusetts 01890.

31.

Janice Bartlett, 52 Ward Road, Topsham, Maine 04086.

32.

Phillip Young, Sr., 539 River Road, Cushing, Maine 04563.

33.

Ronald Reed, 902 Kingscote Court, Safety Harbor, Florida 34695.

34.

Francis Andrews, 22 Tabor Hill Road, Box 267, Lincoln, Massachusetts

35.

Jeffrey Aalberg, 319 Foreside Road, Falmouth, Maine 04105.

36.

W esley Lewis, 1181 Bedford Street, Whitman, Massachusetts 02382.

37.

Stanley Plisgah, Marvel Terrace, Apartment 3C, W inslow, Maine 04901.

38.

Joseph Pelletier, Forest Ranger, 57 Bangor Road, Benton, Maine 04901.

39.

Susan Myers, Forest Ranger, Maine Forest Service, 57 Bangor Road,

04973.

04856.

01773.

Benton, Maine 04901.
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40.

Gary Baker, 10691 Aspen Place, Union, Kentucky 41091-7639.

41.

Michael Lowe, RR1, Box 406, Naples, Maine 04055.

42.

John K. Prescott, RFD1, Madison, Maine 04950.

43.

T. R. Dillon, Madison, Maine 04950.

44.

Brenda Koukol, 152 East Bacon Street, Unit C l, Plainville, Massachusetts

45.

Warren Evans, 12 Evans Ridge Road, Windham, Maine 04062.

46.

Donald R. York, 1165 Morse Road, Thorndike, Maine 04986.

47.

John Dean, 7 Milestone Lane, Madison, Connecticut 06443.

48.

Leslie Thornton, Forest Ranger, Maine Forest Service, 536 Waldoboro

02762.

Road, Jefferson, Maine 04348.
49.

Dana Wrigley, RR1, Box 4295, Oakland, Maine 04963.

50.

Norris Willette, RR3, Box 5770, Winslow, Maine 04901.

51.

Dean Fuller, Box 204 Quimby Road, Albion, Maine 04910.

52.

Blaine Lee, Clinton, Maine 04927.

53.

Tracy Kaufman, Unity, Maine 04988.

54.

Peter Tambone, RR7, Box 1972, Spring Road, Augusta, Maine 04330

55.

Dennis Brennan, District Forester, Maine Forest Service, RFD2, Box 148,

Alfred, Maine 04002.
56.

Michael Heath, Unity, Maine 04988.

The above witnesses may be called at trial. This listing is not an affirmative
representation that any witness listed will, in fact, be called. The Plaintiff also reserves
the right to call witnesses listed by the Defendant and to identify additional witnesses in a
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timely manner in advance o f trial. Witnesses to be called for the purposes of
impeachment, contradiction or rebuttal only have not been listed.
Respectfully submitted,
G. STEVEN ROWE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Dated: January 12,2001
Linda Conti- Me. Bar No.3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department o f Attorney General
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8800
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-132

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE
V.
GERALD NELSON, SR.

)
s / / PLiLtA 'J / 0 A/'
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
PURSUANT TO RULE 41

)
)
)
)

N ow come the parties, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41, and hereby stipulate to the dismissal
o f this action.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated:

2 ^ /
Linda J. Conti - pAt. Bar No.3638
Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Attorney for Plaintiff

Dated:
Michaela Murphy, Esc!
Daviau, Jabar & Batten
1 Center Street
Waterville, Maine 04901-5425
Attorney for Defendant
Gerald Nelson, Sr.
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131

STATE OF M AINE
Plaintiff
vs.
GERALD NELSON, Jr.
Defendant

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

D E FEN D A N T’S W ITNESS
AND EX H IBIT LIST

Defendant, through his undersigned counsel, submits the following Witness and Exhibit
List.
WITNESSES
1.
2.

Gerald Nelson, Jr., P.O. Box 4, Freedom, ME 04941
Mary Nelson, P.O. Box 4, Freedom, ME 04941
EXHIBITS

1.
2.

Delivery and mill slips for each o f the consumer witnesses.
Contracts with each o f the consumer witnesses for the state.

Dated: January 19, 2001
id

Donara L p ásin k , Esq.
82 Winthrop St.
Augusta, ME 04330
Phone: 622-9305

Bar No. 1772

c: \mydocs\Jan01\nelson.lst
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131
)

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

GERALD NELSON, JR.,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF THE STATE’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Plaintiff State of Maine seeks a preliminary injunction against the Defendant
Gerald Nelson, Jr. prohibiting him (1) from making misleading statements to woodlot
owners about the nature and extent of the harvest he plans to perform and the value o f the
wood in violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, (2) from entering into
contracts with consumers that violate the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, and (3)
requiring him to make certain disclosures to consumers. The State submits this
Memorandum in Support of its Motion.
FACTS
On or about June 14,1999, the State filed a Complaint in Superior Court alleging
that the Defendant induced woodlot owners to enter into contracts with him allowing him
to harvest their woodlots by telling them that he would perform a selective harvest that
would improve the overall health of the woodlot. Contrary to his representations
regarding selective cutting, the Defendant stripped the lots of the most valuable wood.
The complaint also alleged that the Defendant misrepresents the value o f the wood
harvested and offers prices for the wood that are well below market value. The complaint

further alleges that the Defendant does not pay for all wood that he takes. The Defendant
generally solicits consumers who are either elderly or reside out-of -state. The State
asserts that this alleged conduct constitutes a pattern or practice o f unfair and deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce in violation o f the Maine Unfair
Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.§ 207.
The State also alleges that the Defendant solicits consumers other than at his place
of business without the consumer initiating the contact. Sometimes he enters into written
contracts with consumers and at other times the contracts are only verbal. The written
contracts that Gerald Nelson, Jr. enters into with consumers do not contain a statement o f
the consumer’s right to avoid the contract by giving a written notice to the seller by
ordinary mail, postage prepaid, within three full business days following the day on
which the contractor sale was made. The State alleges that this practice violates the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 4661-4670.
Gerald Nelson, Jr.’s conduct, as described above, has continued uninterrupted
since the filing o f this Complaint in June o f 1999. The State will present testimony as set
for below from consumers and foresters at a hearing on this Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
W esley Lewis, a resident o f Whitman, Massachusetts, will testify that he owns a
13-acre woodlot on the Maple Ridge Road in Harrison, Maine. In the Fall of 1999 he
received a letter from Gerald Nelson, Jr. in which Nelson told him that he was interested
in performing a “selective cut” on Lew is’ land. Mr. Lewis will testify that he believed
that the lot needed to be thinned out, and therefore he contacted Nelson after he received
the letter. After a phone call, they met on Mr. Lewis’ property in Harrison, Maine. At that
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meeting, Mr. Nelson told him which trees would be cut. Nelson also told Lewis that he
could get $100 for some of the trees. Mr. Lewis did not enter into a written contract and
Mr. Nelson did not tell Mr. Lewis how much he would be paid.
The harvest began just before Thanksgiving o f 1999. Mr. Lewis received a $2,100
check from Mr. Nelson. Since that time, Gerald Nelson, Jr. has promised on three
separate occasions to send Mr. Lewis more money. Since that time Mr. Lewis has visited
the lot and saw that in area it was very heavily cut and not thinned contrary to Nelson's
representations.
On April 18, 2000, Forester Merle Ring conducted a stump cruise on the W esley
Lewis lot in Harrison. They measured 100% of the stump diameters harvested, by
species, as a basis for estimating the volumes and values. Based on this cruise and using
values from the most recent State published stumpage price list and log and veneer specs
and prices from Bear Paul Lumber Co. in Waterford, Maine, where some o f the logs were
taken, Ring determined that the value o f the saw logs and pulp taken from that lot should
be estimated at $24,841. Oak veneer value was estimated at an additional $5,089, for a
total value taken from that lot in that harvest of $29,930.
Gerald Nelson, Jr. approached Stanley Plisga o f W inslow, who is elderly and in
poor health, about property that he owned on the Drummond Road in Sidney. According
to Mr. Plisga, Mr. Nelson came to his house and asked him if he could harvest his lot.
Mr. Plisga entered into a written contract with Gerald Nelson for the harvest o f the timber
on his lot in Sidney on or about January 16, 2000.
Forester Patty Cormier conducted a stump cruise o f Mr. Plisga’s lot. She will
testify that at the time of her inspection, there were still twitches o f wood on the ground,
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scattered within the lot, yet to be skidded to the yard and delivered to a mill, as well as
two piles o f wood on the landing. Cormier performed a 30% strip cruise. The volume and
value o f the harvested forest products was determined by using a computer generated
cruise program used by the Maine Forest Service based on the 1998 stumpage values for
Kennebec County.
The stump cruise provides an estimate of both volume and value for the harvested
area. The average volume of the harvested forest products is 484 cords. The average
value o f the harvested forest products is $17,860 according to the stump cruise. Mr.
Plisga received a total o f $7,779.65 for wood removed from his lot by Mr. Nelson. This
amount represents payment for approximately 205 cords of wood at a fair market value.
Therefore, Mr. Nelson took more wood from Mr. Plisga’s lot than he paid him for, or, in
the alternative, significantly underpaid for what he took.
Gary Baker owns a woodlot in Augusta, Maine. He lives in Kentucky. Gerald
Nelson, Jr. sent him a letter dated August 6, 1999 offering to harvest his woodlot.
Eventually, Mr. Baker had a telephone conversation with Nelson and told him to go
ahead and look at the land and to give him an estimate for the amount o f money Baker
would be paid in stumpage from the harvest. Soon thereafter, in August o f 1999, Nelson
sent Baker an estimate and a draft contract. Nelson recommended extensive fir harvest,
harvest o f mature pine trees and a selective cut for the rest o f the lot. He specifically
recommended that he harvest 40% of the trees.
Mr. Nelson also told Mr. Baker that he would receive $17,000 in stumpage. When
Baker received this information in the mail, he called Nelson and asked him to clarify the
information. Baker specifically asked Nelson whether the $17,000 would be the amount
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that Baker would receive from the harvest. Nelson confirmed that Baker would get
$17,000. Baker was pleased with that and signed the contract in early September o f 1999.
Baker also specifically asked that Nelson complete the project within six months.
Mr. Baker will testify that in late December o f early January 2000 Nelson started
cutting the lot. At that time, Baker asked Nelson when he was going to receive his first
payment. In January of 2000, Baker met with Nelson in Maine at which time Nelson gave
Baker a check for $2,600 and some mill slips.
The harvest continued and throughout the month o f February 2000, Baker made
several attempts to meet with Nelson to pick up another check. Nelson agreed to the
meetings but never showed up. Mr. Baker has visited his lot since the harvest and was
startled and upset at the extent of the harvest.
Forester Patty Cormier conducted a stump cruise o f Gary Baker’s woodlot on
Spring Road in Augusta. All stumps were measured for diameter in two directions inside
the bar, then averaged. The volume and value of the harvested wood was then determined
by the use o f a computer generated cruise program used by the Maine Forest Service
based on 1998 stumpage values for Kennebec County. This cruise was conducted on
April 19, 2000. According to the stump cruise, the average volume o f harvested forest
products is 400 cords and the average value was $17,306. Although Mr. Baker was
promised $17,000 by Mr. Nelson, Mr. Nelson has only paid him $2,600. 1
ARGUM ENT
A.

The State of Maine has Satisfied the Standards for Obtaining a
Preliminary Injunction

1 Nelson entered into all three of these transactions after the State had filed this lawsuit and after
he had filed for bankruptcy. He did not disclose either proceeding to the consumers. Nelson's
Chapter 13 Petition has since been dismissed by the bankruptcy court.
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Four criteria must be met in order to obtain a preliminary injunction. These
criteria are: (1) Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted; (2)
such irreparable harm outweighs any harm to the Defendant; (3) Plaintiff has a likelihood
o f success on the merits; and (4) the public interest is not adversely affected by the
granting of the relief. Ingraham v. University o f Maine at Qrono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me.
1980). However, when the Attorney General seeks an Order to restrain continuing
violations of a State statute, he need not establish that the State will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted, or that the injury to the Plaintiff outweighs any
harm to the Defendant caused by the issuance o f the injunction. See State v. Sirois. 478
A.2d 1117, 1121-1122 (Me. 1984); U.V. Industries v. Posner. 446 F. Supp. 1251, 12551256 (D.Me. 1979). As the District Court explained in U.V. Industries:
‘T he rationale for such an exception with respect to
injunction suits which are ‘creatures o f statute’ is that the
party bringing the suit is acting to vindicate the public
interest.... As the Supreme Court stated in Hecht v.
Bow les. 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944), standards o f the public
interest, not the requirements o f private litigation, measure
the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases.”
466 F. Supp. at 1256. Accordingly, the State must establish only that there is a likelihood
o f success on the merits and that the public interest will not be adversely affected by the
granting o f the requested relief.
B.

The State has Demonstrated a Likelihood o f Success on the Merits

Although the exact contours of an "unfair or deceptive" act have not been
exhaustively defined, unfair acts have been held to include such conduct as withholding
material information, unsubstantiated product claims, high pressure sales tactics, or

6

depriving consumers of post-purchase remedies. Guiggev v. Bombardier. 615 A.2d 1169,
1172-73 (Me. 1992).
1.

Gerald Nelson Jr. Has Engaged in Deceptive Practices

In construing the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M .R.S.A. § 207, this court looks
to federal law interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) for
guidance. See 5 M.R.S.A § 207(1). To show deception under the FTC Act all that is
required is proof that a practice has a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers acting
reasonably. S. Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 4th ed. 138 (National
Consumer Law Center 1997 & Supp. 1998) (hereinafter "Sheldon"). In determining
under the FTC Act whether a practice has a capacity or tendency to deceive the FTC
looks to see whether the intended audience is deceived when it is behaving reasonably for
that audience in the circumstances. If a practice affects or is directed primarily to a
particular group, the FTC examines reasonableness from the perspective o f that group.
Moreover, if a practice affects or is directed primarily at a vulnerable group or individual,
reasonableness should be evaluated from the perspective o f that group or individual.
Sheldon at 147 - 148.
The testimony of the consumers in this matter will show that Defendant targeted
vulnerable, elderly consumers and consumers who lived far from their woodlots. He
promised these woodlot owners that he would selectively harvest their wood and pay a
fair price. The consumers were deceived by these representations as Nelson heavily cut
the lots and failed to pay for the wood he harvested.
According to federal courts interpreting the FTC Act, representations are
deceptive if necessary qualifications are not made or if material facts are not disclosed.

7

Sheldon at 153 - 154. In this case the testimony will show that Gerald Nelson, Jr. did not
disclose to consumers the actual amount of the wood he harvested or the actual value of
the wood harvested.
2.

Gerald Nelson Jr. has engaged in Unfair Trade Practices.

The Law Court has held:
To justify a finding of unfairness [pursuant to the UTPA] the injury must
satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice
produces; and it must be an injury that the consumers themselves could
not have reasonably avoided.
Tungate v. MacLean- Stevens Studios. Inc.. 1998 ME 162, *19, 714 A. 2d 792, citing
Suminski v. Maine Appliance Warehouse. Inc., 602 A. 2d 1173, 1174 n. 1 (Me. 1992).
The testimony will show that the consumers suffered substantial economic harm from
Nelson's harvest. Their loss o f money as well as the harm to their woodlots has no
countervailing benefits. The consumers could not have reasonably avoided the injury, as
they were deceived about the nature and extent of the harvest Nelson was to perform.
3.

Gerald Nelson Jr.'s Violations of the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act Are
Per Se Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Pursuant to the Consumer Solicitations Sales Act:
Where merchandise is sold or contracted to be sold, whether under a
single contract or under multiple contracts, to a consumer as a result o f or in
connection with a salesman's direct contact accomplished by means o f and
including, but not limited to, a personal visit or a telephone call upon the
consumer, other than at the seller's place o f business, without the consumer
soliciting the initial contact, the contract shall be in writing, bear the signature
of the seller and the consumer, contain the date of the transaction, the terms
o f the sale or offer, the name and the mailing address o f the seller's permanent
place of business, a statement of the consumer's right to avoid as provided
in this subchapter....
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32 M.R.S.A § 4662. The testimony of consumers will show that they were contacted by
the Defendant by mail, phone call or personal visit other than at the Defendant's place o f
business. Mr. Lewis did not have a written contract with Defendant as required by law.
Mr. Baker and Mr. Plisga had written contracts, but those contracts did not provide notice
o f their three-day right to cancel the contract. Violations o f the Consumer Solicitations
Sales Act are per se violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 32 M.R.S.A. § 4670.
The testimony of W esley Lewis, Stanley Plisga and Gary Baker, as well as
Foresters Patty Cormier and Merle Ring, will show that Gerald Nelson, Jr. has engaged in
violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act and
that a preliminary injunction, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, restraining Gerald Nelson
Jr.’s unfair and deceptive practices and requiring him to make truthful and accurate
disclosures to consumers is consistent with and required for the protection of the public
interest.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and the testimony to be adduced at hearing, the Plaintiff
requests that its Motion for Preliminary Injunction be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: June 6 ,2 0 0 0
Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V.

GERALD NELSON, JR.,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE

)
)
)
)

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 7(c), matter in opposition to this Motion must be filed
within twenty-one (21) days, unless anther time is provided by the Rules or set by the
Court. Failure to file a timely opposition will be deemed a waiver o f all objections to the
Motion, which may be granted without further notice or hearing.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-99-131
)
)
)
)

GERALD NELSON, JR.,

)
)
)
)

Defendant

)
)

v.

REQUEST FOR HEARING ON MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

We request the Clerk schedule the pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction on
the next available Court date.
The matter to be heard is
(X) Testimonial

( ) Non-Testimonial

To the nearest one-quarter hour, my good faith estimate o f the time which the
hearing will take is four (4) hours.

Dated: June 6, 2000
LINDA J. CONTI - Mb. Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

(207) 626-8800
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FORM B9I (Chapter 13 Case)(9/97) I

Case Number 99-11185

U n it e d S ta tes B a n k r u p t c y C o u r t
District of Maine (Bangor)

Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines
The deb torts) listed below filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case on 7/19/99.
You may be a creditor of the debtor. This notice lists important deadlines. You may want to consult an attorney to protect your
rights. All documents filed in the case may be inspected at the bankruptcy clerk’s office at the address listed below. NOTE: The
staff of the bankruptcy clerk’s office cannot give legal advice.________________________________________ ___________________

See Reverse Side For Important Explanations.
Debtor(s) (name(s) and address):
Gerald Nelson Jr.
Bubba Nelson;Nelson Logging;New England Forestry
P.O. Box 4
Freedom, ME 04941

Social Security/Taxpayer ID Nos.:

Case Number:

007-64-2874

99-11185

Attorney for Debtor(s) (name and address):

Bankruptcy Trustee (name and address):

Donald J. Gasink, Esq.
Gasink & Weisberger
82 Winthrop Street
Augusta, ME 04330

Peter C. Fessenden
P.O. Box 429
Brunswick, ME 04011

Telephone number: (207) 622-9305

Telephone number: (207) 725-1300

Meeting of Creditors:
Date:

09/20/99

Time:

Location:

Best Western Senator Inn, The Board Rooms, Outer Western Avenue, Augusta, ME 04330

3:00 pm

D
p p irllin fiS '
Deadlines:
Papers must be received by the bankruptcy clerk’s office by the following deadlines:
Deadline to Pile a Proof of Claim:
For all creditors (except a governmental unit): 12/20/99
For a governmental unit: 01/15/00
(except for INTERIM DISTRIBUTION, see back page)
Deadline to Object to Exemptions:
Thirty (30) days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors.
Filing of Plan, Hearing on Confirmation of Plan
The debtor has not filed a plan as of this date. You will be sent separate notice of the hearing on confirmation of the plan.________

Creditors May Not Take Certain Actions:
The filing of the bankruptcy case automatically stays certain collection and other actions against the debtor, debtor’s property, and
certain codebtors. If you attempt to collect a debt or take other action in violation of the Bankruptcy Code, you may be penalized.
For the Court:
Address of the Bankruptcy Clerk’s Office:
202 Harlow Street
P.O. Box 1109
Bangor, ME 04402-1109

Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court:
Celia E. Strickler

Telephone number: (207)945-0348
Hours Open:

Date:

8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

07/19/99

025545

c

FORM DIO (Official F o rn i 10)(4/98)
f
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE (BANGOR)

Name of Debtor
Gerald Nelson Jr.

Case Number
99-11185

1Is
if?

e S2

This form should notifié used to make a claim for an administrative cxpcnse arisjng aftei
Jtccment of the case. À "rcum
for P“>,nw,t of •« administrative expense itwy be filet1:
>11 U.S.C £503
Name of Creditor (The person or other cnlity to whom the debtor •G5 Check box if you are aware that
owes money or property):
anyone else has filed a proof of
State o f Maine
claim relating to your claim. Attach
Name and Address where notices should be sent:
copy of statement giving particulars.
□ Check box if you have never
State of Maine
received any notices from the
c/o Office o f Attorney General
bankruptcy court in this case.
6 State House Station
□ Check box if the address differs
Augusta, ME 04335-0006
from the address on the envelope
sent to you by the court.
Telephone Number: ( 2 0 7 ) 6 2 6 —8 8 0 0
Account or other number by which creditor identifies debtor:

1. Basis for Claim
□ Goods sold
□ Services performed
□ Money loaned
□ Personal injury/wrongful death
□ Taxes
B O therS1-.a t - p e n f o r c e m e n t - o f - U n f a i r
2. Date debt was incurred:

Check here if
this claim

□ amends

99 11185 

629232 

T his S pace is fo r C o urt U se O nly

a previously filed claim, dated.

□ Retiree benefits as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a)
□ Wages, salaries, and compensation (fill out below)
Your SS # :____________________
Unpaid compensation for services performed
from___________ to __________________
(date)
(date)
T rade P rH C tiep s Act
3. If court judgment, date obtained:

From 1991 to the present
4. Total Amount of Claim at Time Case Filed:
$1 fi.6.f(10.0— (uni iquidated-see cover letter)
If all or part of your claim is secured or entitled to priority, also complete Item 5 or 6 below.
B Check this box if claim includes interest or other charges in addition to the principal amount of the claim. Attach itemized statement of all
interest or additional charges.
5. Secured Claim.
6. Unsecured Priority Claim.
□ Check this box if yon have an unsecured priority claim
□ Check this box if your claim is secured by collateral
Amount entitled to priority $______ ______ _
(including a right of setoff).
Brief Description of Collateral:
Specify the priority of the claim:
□ Real Estate □ Motor Vehicle
□ Wages, salaries, or commissions (up to $4,300),* earned within 90 days
□ Other_________________
before filing of the bankruptcy petition or cessation of the debtor’s
business, whichever is earlier - 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3).
Value of Collateral: $ ______ ____________ __
□ Contributions to an employee benefit plan - 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(4).
□ Up to $ 1,950* of deposits toward purchase, lease, or rental of property or
services for personal, family, or household use - 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6).
□ Alimony, maintenance, or support owed to a spouse, former spouse, or
child - 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7).
Amount of arrearage and other charges at time case filed
IS Taxes or penalties owed to governmental units - 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
□ Other - Specify applicable paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(__).
included in secured claim, if any: S.__________________
*Amounts are subject to adjustment on 4/1A)1 and every 3 years thereafter
with respect to cases commenced on or after the date o f adjustment.
3 HIS SPACE IS FOR COURT USE ONLY
7. Credits:
The amount of all payments on this claim has been credited and deducted for the purpose of
making this proof of claim.
8. Supporting Documents: Attach copies o f supporting documents, such as promissory notes, purchase
orders, invoices, itemized statements of running accounts, contracts, court judgments, mortgages, security
agreements, and evidence of perfection of lien. DO NOT SEND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS. If the
documents are not available, explain. If the documents are voluminous, attach a summary.
9. Date-Stamped Copy: To receive an acknowledgment of the filing of your claim, enclose a stamped, selfaddressed envelope and copy of this proof of claim.
Date

Sign and print the name and title, if any, ofjjic creditor or other person authorized to file
this claim (attadli copy of powerpCkttoprtey/if any): / i

1 2 / 2 8 / 9 9 T.i n r l a / .7 .__O o n f i .
__f t t t - n r n p v Q p n p r a 1_________
Penalty fo r presenting fraudulent claim: Find of up to 5500,000 or imprisonment lor u p to 5 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571.
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